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Abstract
Jema Sharin Pankiraj. ”TOWARDS AUCTION MECHANISMS FOR PEER-TO-PEER
ENERGY TRADING IN SMART GRIDS.” Under the Supervision of Dr. Abdulsalam Yassine.
The conventional energy grid is being replaced with the new emerging smart grid infras-
tructure. This can be attributed to the fact that it only supports unidirectional energy flow,
i.e., energy is transmitted from the producer to the consumer. Smart grid addresses issues such
as grid reliability, blackouts, global warming, etc, by implementing various renewable energy
sources readily available for consumer use. The clean electric power can be produced from
local neighbourhoods, individual houses, to large industrial businesses. Therefore, with the im-
plementation of alternative energy sources readily available, users connected to the smart grid
can purchase electric power, enabling groups and individuals to generate a profitable income.
However, challenges persist attributed to user cost, and power management, resulting in active
work to investigate optimization techniques between users in P2P energy trading to enhance the
performance of how users trade energy among each other. Among the various energy trading
mechanisms, auction-based models have demonstrated excellent performance, targetting desir-
able properties for P2P energy trading. In this work, we present three different auction-based
models that can be utilized for practical energy trading. The prosumers (producers and con-
sumers) of energy, play the role as sellers or buyers depending on the current supply and demand.
Sellers with renewable energy sources participate to sell their excess of energy to generate a profit
and satisfy the buyers’ demand. We model the interaction with as single-sided and double-sided
auctions, explicitly taking the dynamic nature of both the sellers and buyers into account. We
further propose a profit maximization algorithm that considers power line cost, transmission
capacity, and energy distribution. With theoretical analysis and simulations, we demonstrate
that the proposed auctions are individually rational, truthful, computationally efficient, and
budget-balanced.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There has been active research in the development of optimization techniques for peer-to-peer
energy trading, owing to the recent emergence of the smart grid energy infrastructure. The smart
grid updates the current energy model by utilizing a variety of technologies, e.g., automation,
control systems, wireless sensors and radio-frequency (RF) communication, thus enabling an
information and energy distribution network between consumers and prosumers within the grid.
Additionally, the smart grid promotes users to invest in renewable energy sources to meet their
electricity demands and to generate a profit by distributing any excess surplus energy to a
consumer in a peer-to-peer fashion. Energy trading in a peer-to-peer manner has demonstrated
to be a practical approach for both buyers and sellers to improve the performance of energy
system costs. This is mainly due to providing an alternative source for users to purchase energy
from one another, other than the primary grid.
Several studies such as those in [1], [2] and [3] to name few, suggested market models for
grid control, electricity trading and communication. However, current models need updating
as they do not adequately capture the energy trading process which results in a reduction for
the seller’s profit return and an increase in the buyer’s purchasing costs. This can be more
challenging as the grid infrastructure grows, increasing stress at the distribution level due to a
surge in energy demands, requiring the need for innovative solutions and mechanisms to optimize
the way users trade energy among one other. Furthermore, the outcome of optimizing the way
users participate in energy trading will give incentive for society to make the necessary immediate
transition into the smart grid infrastructure and address the underlying issues such as rapidly
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growing populations, increasing pollution and electricity demands.
The current electricity grid is outdated and will not able to satisfy the requirements for stan-
dard living within the upcoming years. It currently motivates the production of fossil fuels which
significantly harms the environment due to the greenhouse gas effect [4], causing an epidemic in
global warming [5]. The impact of global warming has caused temperatures to rise at an alarm-
ing rate, resulting in rising sea levels, extreme climate conditions, and environmental disasters.
The planet only has a limited source of fossil fuels available for energy production which will be
insufficient within the next few decades [6]. Also, electricity demands are not the same as it was
50 years ago [7].
Transmission lines are overloaded which reduces the grid reliability and results in more
blackouts and brownouts. Increase in brownouts and outages will become more frequent, and
a stable electrical supply will no longer be available. Our current traditional electrical system
eventually will not meet the requirements of society for standard living conditions. Humanity
has become highly dependent on the production of fossil fuels to meet its electricity demands.
However that needs to be changed as that source is becoming scarcer by the day, paving the
need for an immediate shift to satisfy future living. There are many issues with the traditional
grid. It runs in a centralized fashion with one-way communication [8] and only has one central
source of energy which is fed into the lines and distributed to a given destination. Another issue
is the distance between the main generating source of power and consumers. Longer distances
for energy distribution increases the likelihood of losses in the transmission lines, wasting an
enormous amount of energy. Also, it increases the risk in line damages which affects the energy
delivery to the consumers, thus reducing the grid reliability. We need to update the system
that addresses these issues and utilize renewable energy sources to mitigate the effects of global
warming.
1.1 Smart Grid
The smart grid is an emerging electricity grid which uniquely combines communication,
storage systems, and a variety of renewable energy sources readily available for consumers and
producers to trade energy in a peer-to-peer fashion [9] and sufficiently satisfies users’ electricity
demands.
As depicted in Fig. 1.1, the smart grid does not limit itself to only one energy generating
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Figure 1.1: Smart grid infrastructure
source. It supports the infrastructure to distribute energy at multiple locations, thus reducing
the overall stress in the transmission lines and improving the grid reliability. It further mitigates
transmission line losses, since distances between consumers and producers are minimized due
to the multitude of sources available at the distribution level. Users, such as homeowners,
commercial, and industrial businesses, can connect to the smart grid and satisfy their energy
demands by purchasing power at an alternative source or investing in green energy sources,
e.g., wind, solar, hydro, geothermal, tidal. This will also address the adverse effects of global
warming [10, 11, 12], by reducing gas pollution from generating clean energy at multiple sources
[13]. Furthermore, with technological advancements in solar, as demonstrated in [14], where type
III-V semiconductors for photovoltaic applications have reached efficiencies close to 30%, making
the investment profitable for energy producers.
In addition to renewable energy sources, the smart grid employs alternative electric storage
systems, such as supercapacitors, hybrid, hydrogen, and pneumatic technologies [15, 16, 17].
Alternatively, electric vehicles have demonstrated to be an effective storage system for smart
grid applications. Electric cars have gained immense popularity over the past few years, and will
soon surpass gas vehicle production, resulting in efficient energy storage systems. These storage
systems have improved the cost performance of generating and storing energy since power is not
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being wasted, and have improved the energy efficiency for distribution. Therefore, since the grid
enables reliable and secure energy generating sources with multiple distribution points to reduce
stress and to meet the demand of all users connected to the network, the grid reliability can be
improved.
1.2 Research Motivations
This work is motivated to design P2P energy trading models and optimize the way users trade
energy to improve energy waste management and conservation of energy. In addition, push the
reliance and popularity of clean energy production as opposed to fossil fuels and improve grid
reliability by reducing the stress at the distribution level for the smart grid infrastructure. By
designing energy trading models for P2P distribution, and optimizing the profit return by reduc-
ing energy bills and increasing sellers profit outcome upon energy production and distribution,
users will be motivated to participate. However, there is minimal interest in users investing in
energy sources. One possible solution to address the problem is to incentivize users to generate
and trade electric power through the smart grid.
Unfortunately, since the process for energy trading is a relatively new technology that is only
available in limited areas, the incentives for users to produce clean electric power by participating
in the energy trading process requires significant attention. Therefore, this research focuses on
optimizing the energy trading process, thus motivating individuals to participate in green energy
production and profitable trading to enhance grid reliability. To optimize the energy trading
process in a peer-to-peer fashion, it is critical to model the grid system in an effective method and
to consider all underlying properties such as individual rationality, truthfulness, time complexity,
fairness and budget balanced. Additionally, the mechanisms for the way of purchasing and selling
energy requires significant attention.
This work focuses on modelling the energy trading models and utilizes an auction mechanism
to optimize the social welfare for an energy trading market for sellers and buyers. Thus, the
primary motivation of this work is to design different approaches and models for the users’ to
trade energy which will directly benefit by either reducing the energy bill, increasing profit return
and maximizing the overall social welfare.
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1.3 Research Problem
The main research problem of this work focuses on optimizing the P2P energy trading pro-
cess for sellers and buyers within a smart-grid network. To address these problems, there needs
to be an accurate energy trading model that considers properties and characteristics of a trad-
ing system. When designing an energy trading model the main goal is to maximize the social
welfare of both the sellers and buyers. Therefore, it is critical to capture the cost of the underly-
ing infrastructure to prepare the model for practical use. Furthermore, the model must exhibit
the following properties: truthfulness, individual rationality, budget balanced, computation effi-
ciency, and fairness. Optimal buyers or sellers can be identified using the first price bid which
may not guarantee the truthfulness of the system. The main purpose of designing an auction
model is to guarantee all the five properties.
Additionally, the problems of this work focus on technical issues such as, establishing a
mechanism in which the buyers and sellers can purchase and sell energy from one another taking
into account infrastructure variables, such as demand, grid flow, storage capacity, transmission
costs, etc. Lastly, the algorithms and matching networks must be designed to optimize the social
welfare of the system, i.e., match the buyers and sellers optimally.
1.4 Peer-to-peer Energy Trading
Peer-to-peer energy trading is a novel prototype [18] of power system operation which allows
users to generate and trade renewable energy. Trading refers to exchanging a product and
benefiting from the return. More accurately, energy trading is defined as selling a surplus of
energy to a buyer that is in demand, which results in a profit return to the seller. Buyers are
considered to be consumers and sellers are considered to be prosumers with respect to time.
Buyers are more motivated to purchase energy from the seller since the energy was generated
from a green source and is typically cheaper than the main grid. Furthermore, by producing
clean energy and distributing within small networks, the transmission line stress is mitigated
since the overall demand required from the main grid is reduced.
Energy trading can be performed through a seller and buyer directly. Alternatively, energy
trading can be performed in a market form with the assistance of an auctioneer. This form is
referred to as an energy market and consists of active sellers and buyers for energy trading and
captures concepts such as consumption, generation, and storing [19].
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The smart grid effectively integrates peer-to-peer energy trading. As shown from Fig. 1.2 a
peer-to-peer connection is made between buyers and sellers to trade energy within the network,
enabling users to purchase power from alternative sources. Peer-to-peer trading is one of the main
focuses of this work. It is critical to accurately describe the function of this given application
and to further optimize the way the trading is performed.
Figure 1.2: Smart grid network with peer-to-peer energy trading
There are several emerging Peer-to-Peer energy trading projects such as Vandebron, Smart
Watts, Yeloha and Mosaic, SonnenCommunity, Peer Energy Cloud and TransActive Grid are
emerging energy markets with a combination of software and hardware for energy trading between
the sellers and buyers to trade energy. The proposed mechanism in this work is in-line with these
application.
1.5 Methodology
To design an accurate model for energy trading to maximize the social welfare for sellers and
buyers, it begins by considering practical elements of the network. Examples of these consid-
erations include transmission line capacity, buyer’s bid cost, seller’s asking price, the distance
between buyer and seller, surplus energy, etc. Next, constraints within the network need to be
accounted for. For example, users cannot distribute energy which affects the transmission line
resulting in line failure. Another example is sellers cannot distribute more energy than they have
produced. Once the constraints and characteristics of the network are accurately modelled, opti-
mization techniques are systematically carried out to maximize the social welfare of the network.
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The methodology can be briefly summarized as follows
• Accurately model the energy trading network and mechanism.
• Implement constraints for practical scenarios.
• Optimize the solution to maximize the social welfare.
1.6 Contribution
The main contributions of this work present three different models to accurately describe
the energy trading mechanism for a P2P smart grid. The first two models are applied for a
single-sided auction mechanism whereas the third model was used for a double-sided auction.
This section summarizes the contributions related to P2P energy trading models in detail.
1.6.1 P2P Energy Trading Models
The first model is utilized for a single seller within a P2P energy trading grid that demon-
strates an alternative approach to increase the profit return of seller, which further motivates
users to generate clean energy. This work also presented a profit maximization algorithm (PMA)
that is specifically made for the sellers to optimize and maximize their profit return. This PMA
was analysed using a normal distribution, uniform distribution and exponential distribution. In
all the three distributions, simulations were performed and a comparison was made with our
proposed PMA and the first price bid method and the second price bid method. As a result,
the proposed mechanism outperforms the first price bid and second price bid significantly by
generating an increase in profit return.
The second model demonstrates a solution for the buyer to find the optimal seller with the
minimal cost, thus increasing the pay off of the buyer. A proposed cost minimization algorithm
(CMA) was demonstrated to reduce the buyer’s energy costs and compared with first and second
price bid mechanisms. Similarly, the CMA was tested using a normal, exponential, and uniform
distribution to simulate and make a comparison. Based on the simulations results, the CMA
outperforms the existing methods by reducing the overall buyer’s cost, demonstrating a practical
approach to reduce and optimize the buyers cost.
The third model demonstrates a matching mechanism for an energy trading market (ETM),
which consists of an auctioneer to match the sellers and buyers such that the social welfare of
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the system is maximized. A proposed auction matching algorithm (AMA) was demonstrated to
effectively match the sellers and buyers.
1.7 Publications
• Conference:
The 10th International Conference on Ambient Systems, Networks and Technologies (ANT).
Title: An Auction Mechanism for Profit Maximization of Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading in
Smart Grids.
Authors : Jema Sharin Panki Raj, Abdulsalam Yassine, Salimur Choudhury.
• Journal :
IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing.
Title: Double-Sided Auction Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading Markets.
Authors : Jema Sharin Panki Raj, Abdulsalam Yassine, Salimur Choudhury.
1.8 Thesis Outline
• Chapter 1 presents the introduction and motivation of this work. It discusses the emerging
smart grid, research motivation, research problem and P2P energy trading. Additionally,
the methodology is shown along with the contributions of this work.
• Chapter 2 discusses the background information on energy trading and auction mechanisms.
In addition a literature overview is provided.
• Chapter 3 describes the proposed energy trading models for P2P smart grids. A discussion
of the critical variables and parameters of the smart grid is also demonstrated.
• Chapter 4 demonstrates the proposed single-sided auction model 1 and 2 with results and
analysis. Simulations are tested for various case studies and a comparison is made with
existing mechanisms.
• Chapter 5 presents the proposed double-sided auction model for an energy trading market
(ETM). An auctioneer performs the matching between the sellers and buyers in the ETM
using auction matching algorithm (AMA) with respect to their bid, ask, surplus energy and
the demand.
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• Chapter 6 concludes the overall research work and provide future suggestions to improve
the P2P energy trading in smart grids.
Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review:
2.1 Energy Trading
Energy trading is possible with emerging smart grid infrastructure since it utilizes two-
communication and two-way energy transfer, necessary for traders to send and receive energy
between each other [20]. Fig. 2.1 shows a simplified energy trading model which consists of a
single prosumer and a single consumer connected to the smart grid. Depicting that the prosumer
and consumer have the resources to transmit and receive energy. The main advantage of the
smart grid is that the user can send back their surplus energy to the consumer in need or to the
main electric grid, which is currently not possible using the traditional grid.
Figure 2.1: Simple energy trading infrastructure
Energy trading models and optimization techniques have been previously demonstrated and
have been become an active research topic. One specific example is a model for smart factories
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designed in [21], to perform intelligent energy trading. The work, however, proposes a model
to trade energy between the consumer and supplier in smart factories and utilizes a time limit
for bidding. Meaning, the players in the network are allocated time slots to purchase energy.
Once the bidding time is over, the market server decides and notifies the winner. The energy is
then distributed to the winner. This is one of the many techniques in which energy trading can
be performed. In the following sections, the basic variables and properties of an energy trading
model will be discussed.
2.2 Auction Mechanisms
The auction-based mechanism is adopted in multiple areas and fields. Examples include
but are not limited to, airport time slot allocation, cloud resource allocation, RFQ support
process, baseball free-agent draft, procurement, and search advertisement [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27].
Auction mechanisms are used everywhere for a fair buying and selling for any product. Examples
of types of auctions are English auction, Dutch auction, sealed bid auction, Vickrey auction and
reverse auction, etc. Each auction differs slightly from each other according to their property.
Mainly, auctions are classified into sealed bid auction and iterative auction. These auctions have
demonstrated powerful use in P2P energy trading for buyers and sellers to effectively purchase
and seller energy. Here, in this work, a sealed bid auction is utilized for trading the energy.
2.2.1 Sealed Bid Mechanism
A sealed bid is a type of auction process in which all the players bid for the same product
available in the market, and no players know the bid of other players. All players must submit
their complete bid [28]. Usually, the player with the highest bid wins the auction. For example,
assume that there is a product available in the market for sale and three buyers {B1, B2, B3}
need that product. Each buyer will have their own valuation {V1, V2, V3} on the product. The
valuation is an intrinsic relationship with the product and the buyer. Typically, a buyer will have
a higher valuation for renewable energy sources as opposed to energy generated through fossil
fuels. Furthermore, the buyer will submit a sealed bid {b1, b2, b3} for that product according
to their valuation. No other buyers have any information of the bid of other buyers within
the network. The bids are sealed and only the seller and the corresponding buyer have the
information regarding the bid. Suppose that buyer B3 submitted the highest bid b3 and assume
that buyer B2 has the next highest bid b2. The bids are then sorted in descending order according
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to their value, i.e. {b3, b2, b1}. If the type of seal bid mechanism used is first price bid (FPB),
the buyer j with the highest bid will win the auction and pay the submitted bid (bj) as the
payment to the seller for the market product. In this case, b3 is paid to the seller. Alternative, in
a second price bid (SPB) mechanism, the buyer with the highest bid wins and pays the second
highest bid. This is summarized in Table 2.1. Therefore, B3 still wins the auction but pays the
bid b2 as the payment for the seller. Thus, a seal bid mechanism is a practical approach when
implementing an auction for P2P energy trading.
Sealed bid type Winning buyer’s payment
First price bid Highest bid
Second price bid Second highest bid
Table 2.1: Comparison of buyers’ payment in first and second price bid
2.2.2 Single and Double-Sided Auction
The most commonly used auctions for product selling and buyer are the single sided auction
and the double-sided auction. In a single-sided auction, all the players or buyers will be bidding
on the same product from the seller [29]. Mainly, the seller does not ask for any specific price
for the selling product and all the buyers play against each other by bidding on the product.
Another distinction is made that it does not have to be a buyer bidding on a product. It can be
a buyer that is in need of a specific product, and the sellers play among each other by trying to
sell the requested product for a given price. The main point is the auction only receives variables
from a single side.
Similarly, in a double-sided auction, all the buyers will submit their bid. However, the sellers
also ask for a specific price, i.e., ask price, for the product they are trying to sell [30]. Therefore,
additional variables are introduced in the auction. Hence, both the bid and the ask from the
buyer and seller respectively. These auctions are the foundation of this work to perform energy
trading, in which this work explores alternative P2P energy trading models based on single and
double-sided auctions.
2.2.3 VCG
The above utilized auctions are based under the assumption that buyers and sellers are sub-
mitting their bids and ask using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. This mechanism
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ensures that all players in the auction are acting in a truthful manner [31]. When the energy
trading models are designed, this assumption that participants are acting in a truthful manner is
also made in [32, 33]. VCG mechanisms assist the users to achieve an optimal solution [34] in a
truthful manner. Furthermore, consider in the payment method, the winning player (the player
with the highest bid) will pay the bid of the second highest player. This is referred to as “second
price bid” and will not encourage the buyers to bid low or the sellers to ask high. However,
VCG is always a weak budget based only if an auctioneer is introduced. Thus, the profit of the
auctioneer is always zero. As a result, the seller receives whatever the buyer pays [35, 36].
Moreover, each player has their own valuation on the product. We denote the sellers’ val-
uation as Vi and the buyers’ valuation as Vj. The seller submits the ask ai according to their
valuation and the buyer submits the bid bj according to their valuation. The utility function U
is given below, where the utility of the winning seller and buyer is Ui = ai − Vi, Uj = Vj − bj
respectively. The utility of the losing buyer or seller = 0. When the players follow the VCG
mechanism, it will not encourage any buyers to submit a low bid bj. Because if the buyer submits
a low bid, they might not win and if only two players are present, the buyer with the highest
bid wins and pays only the second highest bid. Similarly, VCG will never encourage the seller
to submit a high ask ai.
2.3 Properties
A feasible auction mechanism should satisfy the properties of individual rationality, computa-
tional efficiency, truthful, fairness and budget balanced. The following properties are summarized
below [37].
• Individual rationality: All the participating users in the auction should have a non-
negative payoff. Mainly, when a seller sells a product for a specific ask price, they will not
have to reduce their ask. And if a buyer bids a given value, they will not have to pay more
if they win the auction [38].
• Computational efficiency: The auction outcome should be intractable with polynomial
time complexity. Mainly, the time complexity of the system does not following an expo-
nential relationship, in which more users prolong simulation and functionality.
• Truthfulness: The players in the auction do not cheat and are truthful with their values
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and cost when buying and selling products. It is not easy to follow truthfulness in the
auction; however, monitoring certain conditions will rectify it [39].
• Fairness: This mechanism should be designed fair for all the users by providing equal
opportunities to participate in the auction. The mechanism should be fair enough to all
the buyers and sellers in submitting the asks and bids according to their valuation. No
buyer or seller wins the auction in any other different ways other than following the design
(treated equally). When a mechanism follows truthfulness, it naturally supports the fairness
property [40].
• Budget balanced: If there is an auctioneer in the model, the welfare of the auctioneer
should be non-negative [41].
2.4 Related Works
As previously mentioned, energy trading has become an active research topic since renewable
energy sources have become a high-market demand. Additionally, motivating users to transition
to renewable sources by providing incentives through optimization techniques has also been a
popular topic. Also noting that energy trading is only possible through the smart grid. Here, in
this section, research based on energy trading will be presented.
In [42] the authors’ present the design and implementation of a modus-operand for an energy
market in a smart grid neighbourhood to study and observe the effects of a practical energy
trading system. Similarly, a transactive energy (TE) scheme is introduced in [43] to determine
energy trading strategies among the transactive energy markets consisting of buyers and sellers.
However, the work considers only photovoltaic (PV) as the renewable energy source within
the market. And simulations are carried to analyze the effects of a 30-year lifespan for PV
arrays to uniquely predict the system’s functionality for future dates. [3] uses a distributed
and centralized market scheme for an energy trading network. The goal was to provide an
overview and comparison between markets by determining which benefits the local market users
(prosumers and consumers) based on profit returns and further provide a connection between
these two markets. The system model’s objective was to minimize the energy self-consumption
of prosumers. Further, the distributed market, which focuses on a peer-to-peer (P2P) exchange
approach by dealing with individual buyers and sellers, was based on the continuous double
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW: 16
auction (CDA) method whereas the centralized market focuses on the overall information of all
users within the network and looks to maximize the global welfare of the system. This market
was implemented using both an energy trading algorithm identifying the market equilibrium and
a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) method. Based on the results, the local markets performance
was found that regardless of the market scheme, both techniques provide benefits to the users.
In [44] the authors present a novel fair energy framework for energy trading among microgrid
clusters. The goal was to reduce energy fluctuation, maintain balance within the infrastructure
and promote local energy trading. The model uses an energy market operator (EOM) that acts
as the energy allocation member. The EOM will collect data from all the buyers and arrange
them based on their demands. Then, attempt to allocate each buyer to an optimal seller. In
addition, the model uses a free-market approach by letting the sellers select their surplus to
sell. [45] presents a customer energy trading mechanism for P2P microgrids. The authors tested
various pricing mechanisms, e.g., conventional, unified, identified. It was found that unified and
identified significantly reduce the energy bill of the users within the system model. However,
simulations were pertained to a small-scale amount of users. [46] implemented a technique
for a day ahead approach for virtual power plant owners. This allowed for accurate energy
consumption predictions by taking into account weather forecasts, which causes fluctuation in
energy generation for solar and wind producers.
Thus, looking to optimize the power plant owners profit income. A mixed-integer linear
programming model for a single end-user is demonstrated in [47] for green energy generation
and to reduce energy waste. Green energy is purchased and sold through the internet of energy
(IoE), illustrating a possible technique for users to trade and sell energy. Additionally, a genetic
algorithm is proposed involving a more substantial number of variables and constraints for the
buyers and sellers. In [48], a P2P energy trading framework using a hierarchical approach is
developed for energy markets in microgrids. The hierarchy is used for future large scale markets
and consists of a top level utility grid that interfaces with a microgrid energy trader. The energy
trader then communications with community energy traders. The community energy traders are
split up for various neighborhoods. The hierarchy configuration is compared with regular P2P
trading networks, resulting in a high performance method as the overall system costs for buyers
is significantly reduced. Similarly, in [49] presented a hierarchy approach for small-scale energy
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trading while utilizing contract theory. The hierarchy consists of three main levels. The first and
second level consist of the main macrogrid and aggregator respectively. The third level captures
the entiree buyer and seller network. The authors in [50] present a P2P energy trading network
that utilizes bilateral contracts. The network consists of three different agents, e.g., prosumers,
suppliers and generators. This paper [51] uses a novel framework based on game theory to study
the energy trading decision between the players in the energy trading model and demonstrated
to be an effective approach. Therefore, we see that energy trading within the smart grid has
been extensively studied. Next, we consider possible storage systems for this electric power.
The author in [52] tested the performance of the local markets using continuous double
auction mechanism and a Homer optimization [53] is used to reduce the cost of the energy. Two-
stage Stackelberg game [54] with different cases where energy users and shared facility authority
(SFA) trade energy. The main motivation of this paper is to encourage all the energy users to
participate in energy trading. Similarly, in [37] proposed a matching technique between mobile
devices towards nearby cloudlets considering that the cloudlets as sellers and mobile devices as
buyers. Which is similar to the pairing made in this research with sellers and buyers. The
author forms two main stages of determining the winning buyer. The first stage is ”Candidate-
Determining and pricing,” and the Second stage is ”Candidate-elimination.” Here the author
makes matching only with one buyer to one seller where in this work matching is made with a
group of buyers to the seller and a group of sellers with a buyer. Similarly, a VCG based auction-
based mechanism is proposed in [55] which is designed to increase the revenue of the user. In
[56], the author uses an approach to the problem by linear programming (LP) assignment. The
main objective is to satisfy the seller and buyer by maximizing their revenue.
The optimization model is proposed in [57] and [58] are similar to the problem discussed
in the proposed model. In this work, the constraints were designed variably for ensuring the
energy transferred between the sellers and buyers are not affecting the transmission line capacity.
A different approach to maximizing the seller’s profit using profit maximization algorithm is
proposed in this work. Furthermore, two different models with a different approach for energy
trading under P2P fashion are provided. Model one suits for single user and model suits for
market models. In model 1 seller have the full control for deciding the amount of energy for
trading. Besides the theoretical appeal of the proposed energy trading mechanism, we consider
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the geographic distribution of both sellers and buyers by incorporating energy transmission costs.
The proposed mechanism is based on game theory, where buyers choose the best sellers from
whom to buy energy to minimize their energy bill. We also offer a centralized optimization
model that reduces the system energy bill. We evaluate the performance of the proposed game
by extensive simulations, where we compare its performance against the optimization model. An
alternative approach to address the incentive for income was demonstrated in [59]. In which the
authors disregard the profit motivation and consider the value of alternative energy sources. This
is done by treating energy sources has heterogeneous products. By allowing individuals to choose
by personal preferences based on the inherent attributes of the energy source. The authors in
[60] provide an excellent summary into the potential of game-theoretic approach for P2P energy
trading. Since game theory has the capability of optimization. In general, the game-theoretic
approaches used can be eight non-cooperative or cooperative. From this work, we observe the
wide interest in optimization for energy trading markets.
Auction models are also extensively used in smart grid applications. Here, the work in [61]
introduces an auction model for local markets, with a proposed mechanism to assist buyers in
finding the lowest cost for energy purchasing. A distributed algorithm is drafted in this paper to
maximize utility efficiency. The work did not simulate using realistic energy trading model as only
a set of seven buyers and sellers have been examined. In this paper [62] the author propose an
algorithm that enables base stations to trade energy using a double auction framework. Here, the
main contribution is to reduce non-renewable energy consumption in multi-tier cellular networks.
The primary purpose of this paper [63] is to build an optimal bidding strategy for day-ahead,
auction-based electricity markets. Which would improve system efficiency by preparing system
functionality. In this paper [64], an agent-based model is proposed for spectrum trading and
the payment is made using the first price bid method. Here, the author proposes an algorithm
which controls the bidding strategies of the bidder. Different levels of risk are discussed using
two different decision fusion strategies. Finally, the results analyze the environmental risk, total
revenue of the bidder and the revenue of the auctioneer. In a Peer-to-Peer network, the blockchain
method gives the trust for trading at each point [65, 66, 67].
An efficient iterative double-sided auction is proposed in [68] which increases the social welfare
of the agents within the network. The author used double auction mechanism for allocating the
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resource among multiple agents and the main objective of this paper is to maximize the social
welfare [69]. This framework is generic and applies to P2P overlays. Additionally, the behaviour
of the energy production of renewable energy sources has received minimal consideration. This
disregards practical situations in which users connected to the grid experience. Mainly, deviations
in energy generation and consumption. A truthful double-sided market is designed using a greedy
allocation mechanism proposed in [70] for cloud markets. In [71] the auctioneer uses a double
auction mechanism to determine the winning sellers and winning buyers. The author in [20]
shows the benefits of energy trading using the smart grid followed by an investigation about
optimizing their benefits. Double-sided auction is always better than single-side auction since
it allows both sellers and buyers to ask and bid depending on the valuation [72]. Activity rules
are proposed in [73] which makes the buyers bid sincerely. A comprehensive review of various
incentive approaches for energy trading is studied in [74]. Further, energy trading is investigated
in a new cloud-based scenario with vehicle-to-vehicle. Efficient energy trading schemes are been
reviewed. A mechanism for two-sided cloud markets is designed in [75] using a double auction
mechanism. Conceptual investigation for load server entities (LSE) using double auction is
studied in [76]. The risk of the low bid and high ask has been reduced using their designed
mechanism. Therefore, we see the popularity in auction mechanisms utilized for the energy
trading process. Next, we review work based on energy storage systems.
Alternative energy storage systems are readily available to allow users to store generated
energy. The one that has received considerable interest over the past few years is electric ve-
hicles [77]. Additionally, the authors’ study the smart grid storage systems to assist in energy
trading functionality. Mainly, optimization techniques have been explored to improve the cost
performance of such systems. Thus, a formulation of a global scheduling problem to minimize
the total cost of the all-electric vehicle performing charging and discharging during a day is per-
formed. Similarly, [78] studies the effects that plug-in vehicles cause to decentralized grids. The
effects arise from the erratic behaviour the peak demand experiences and congestion in network
capability. They further demonstrated how these storage systems could be beneficial to the grid
by providing alternative storage sources. This relieves balancing and congestion issues for the
main grid. Since in some practical situations, the main grid itself will experience limitations
others may not. The study of scheduling and optimizing problems for charging and discharging
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of electric vehicles (EV’s) is also studied in [79]. The authors in [80] use electric vehicles to relax
and reduce the level of supply and demand mismatch. This approach is referred to as vehicle to
grid (V2G). The authors also present an energy trading framework used for the V2G by using
the block chain and edge computing. This was done to enhance security and efficiency of the
V2G energy trading framework. From recent work, we see that there has been active research
to study the effects of electric vehicles used for storage systems and reduce distribution stress
within smart grids. Following is a discussion of work focusing on important topics related to
privacy and security.
Moreover, another issue for energy trading is security and privacy which is the essential
factor in protecting participators privacy securely, studied in [81, 82]. [83] presented a P2P
energy framework analysis of Blockchain, Block Lattice and Directed Acyclic Graph (the Tangle)
to demonstrate the performance in comparison relative to assisting the buyers financially and
securely. A secure energy trading model was designed in [84] that demonstrated how secure an
energy trading microgrid is without the need of a third-party present. Security has also been
an emerging research area for energy trading applications. A similar approach was proposed in
[85], where the authors implemented energy trading priorities for users connected to a residential
microgrid. These types of networks mainly arise in isolated communities. Where the energy
production of the grid itself may be of major concern. These measures were also considered in
[86]. The authors took into account that overall energy independence of a microgrid. Where the
overall structure of the grid was on an island. This work allows for a useful metric to compare
energy trading schemes. Moreover, the work allows individual buyers and sellers to trade energy
among themselves before trading with the main grid. This was to address issues nearby homes
may experience such as power outages. They also used a game-theoretic approach and compared
the two analyses. Where the latter approach was found to minimize the overall electricity bills
of participants. Here [87] the author presented a blockchain method for individual buyers to buy
their neighbours excess photovoltaic generated power. Demonstrated in [88], the work shows
a similar network with an auction mechanism where the aim is maximizing the social welfare
presenting an example where two sellers and one buyer are trading energy, where the buyer fixes
the price. The author gave two cases showing how the buyer receives energy from the seller.
Here we see extensive work focusing on improving the security and privacy of users connected to
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a smart grid.
The below Table 2.2 compare the single and double-sided auction mechanisms used in various
industries and the constraints used in the energy industry, additionally, this work proposes both
single and double-sided auction mechanisms for energy trading models considering the major





Line cost TX Line
capacity
Industry
[88, 30, 9] 3 3 Energy
[37] 3 Mobile service
[58, 89, 90] 3 Energy
[64, 91] 3 Spectrum trading
[69, 92, 93] 3 Resource allocation
[57] 3 Energy
[94] 3 Cellular network
[95] 3 Cloud Computing
[63, 96] 3 Energy
[97] 3 Job scheduling
This work 3 3 3 3 Energy
Table 2.2: Comparison table
2.5 Discussion
In this chapter, a discussion on energy trading based around auction mechanisms was pre-
sented. The examination of an energy trading model with considering the line cost, and trans-
mission line capacity was shown. Moreover, the energy trading models present in this work are
built upon both a single and double side auction. In addition, these auctions are based on the
seal-bid approach in which buyers have no information on other buyers and sellers have no in-
formation on other sellers in the network. Furthermore, these auctions are based upon the VCG
mechanism which assumes players are participating in a truthful manner and respect the rules
of the game. It was also shown the critical properties in which for a feasible auction it should
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be following individual rationality, computational efficiency, truthfulness, fairness and budget
balanced. Lastly, it was shown the vast interest and unique approaches to related works based
on energy trading and smart grid applications. Concluding the strong points of this work in a
comparison table in which previous work has yet to perform.
Chapter 3
Energy Trading Models
3.1 Proposed Energy Trading Models
This section proposes the mechanisms utilized for the three energy models. In the first model,
we considered a single seller with multiple buyers and analyzed how to optimize and increase
the profit of the seller. Fig. 3.1 depicts the simplified diagram of this model. All the buyers
participate for the same product, and no buyer has any information about any other buyers.
The buyers communicate only with the seller regarding the product and the buyer submit the
bid to the seller in a sealed bid fashion so that no other buyer knows about the bid. The buyer
with the highest profit wins the auction. This type of energy trading model composed of a single
seller with multiple buyers trading is also demonstrated in [98, 99, 100].
Figure 3.1: Single seller with multiple buyer energy trading model
The second model is depicted in Fig. 3.2, designed under the consideration of multiple sellers
and a single buyer. It is also analyzed to determine how a buyer can obtain energy at the possible
lowest cost. Additionally, sellers submit the ask and amount of energy to the buyer, and no seller
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knows about the other sellers’ valuation or ask price. The seller communicates only with the
buyer regarding the amount of product and the ask for the product. All the sellers submit their
ask to the buyers in a sealed bid fashion such that no other sellers know the asks submitted
by other sellers. The buyer selects the seller with the cheapest ask and selects the clean green
energy with a lesser cost. Thus the seller with the least ask wins the auction.
Figure 3.2: Multiple seller with single buyer energy trading model
The third model is depicted in Fig. 3.3, consisting of multiple sellers and multiple buyers.
Here, an auctioneer is introduced to perform the matching between the sellers and the buyers.
Sellers submit their surplus energy and the ask to the auctioneer and the buyer submits the
demand and bid to the auctioneer. In addition, the buyers and sellers communicate only with
the auctioneer and the role of the auctioneer is to match the sellers and buyers which optimizes
the social welfare of the energy trading network. This type of network was demonstrated in
[101, 102, 103, 104] for energy trading in multiple microgrids.
In this following section, we discuss the players in the network of the energy trading models.
3.2 Players
The players in the network consist of both buyers (j) and sellers (i). Each play interact
differently within the system. This section explain the distinction between the players in regards
to energy trading.
3.2.1 Sellers
The users who have the ability to generate energy (e) are referred to as sellers or prosumers.
After consuming their energy requirements, and if they are left with any surplus energy, they can
trade that surplus energy to other users in network who are currently in demand and are willing
to buy the surplus energy from the seller. In return, the seller will generate a profit for trading
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Figure 3.3: Multiple seller with multiple buyer energy trading model
and selling the energy to another user. The sellers cost is the cost required to generate a certain
amount of energy. This cost includes the operating and maintenance cost for the generating
device that harvests the electric power. The sellers obtain surplus energy after consuming their
demands, which is the leftover generated energy or the stored energy. The surplus energy is
denoted as ei. The ask price is the price asked by the seller for their current amount of surplus
energy, and it is denoted as ai. The objective of the seller is to produce green, clean energy and
consume it, so the seller does not buy energy from the grid. In addition, the seller in this work
is to sell the surplus clean energy to the network and return a profit out of it. The seller is also
motivated to maximize their profit return.
3.2.2 Buyers
The buyers are the users in demand and are willing to buy green energy from the sellers.
Their current demand is represented as dj. The buyers will also have a bid or cost in which
they are willing to pay to purchase any energy. The bid is the offering from the buyer for their
demand energy and it is denoted as bj. The objective of the buyer is to buy clean energy from
the sellers. In addition, the buyer is motivated to minimize their independent energy costs.
3.2.3 Auctioneer
The auctioneer is a third party in the network where both the sellers and buyers both submit
their surplus energy, ask, demand and bid. An auctioneer is needed only when multiple sellers
and multiple buyers are in the energy trading network. The main objective of the auctioneer is
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to match and optimize the sellers and buyers where both the sellers and buyers benefit [105]. In
addition, the objective of the auctioneer is maximize the social welfare [106, 107] by matching
the sellers and the buyers in an optimal method. Also, no players including the auctioneer should
generate negative profits, at the worst case the pay can be zero but it should never be in negative.
3.3 Parameters
We represent the set of sellers as S and each member inside the set is denoted as i. The gen-
erated energy by the seller is denoted as Ei, after consuming their local demands, the remaining
energy, i.e., surplus energy, is denoted as ei and the ask price for the selling energy is ai where
i ∈ S.
There might be a case where the sellers will sell only apart from the surplus energy ei since
the profit may result as negative. In that case, the seller may store the remaining energy. The
selling energy is denoted as ek and the storing energy is ey, thus ei = ek + ey. The surplus energy
is the summation of the selling energy and storing energy. When the seller sells the whole surplus
energy ei then, ey = 0
In the single-sided auction models, the seller pays the line cost cl for transporting the energy
to the buyer. The line cost cl depends on the the profit of the seller. which is calculated by the
difference in the bid bj from the buyer and the loses. The total loss of the seller is the summation
of the operating cost ci and the line cost cl for transporting the energy to the buyer. Moreover,
the seller calculates the profit for each buyer and selects the buyer with the highest profit as the
winner and if the profit from all the buyer resulted in zero, then the seller stores the energy.
The set of buyers are represented as B and each buyer inside the set is denoted as j. The
demand from the buyer is dj and the bid for their demanded energy is bj where j ∈ B. In the
first two models (single-sided auction models), the buyer does not pay for the line cost cl. The
goal of the buyer is to select the seller with a minimum ask ai and buys the clean green energy.
In the third model (double-Sided auction model), consists of multiple seller and multiple
buyers. Here all the players pay the line cost cl for using the grid’s transmission line. In this
model, an auctioneer is introduced to match the sellers and buyers.
3.4 Discussion
This chapter provided a general overview of the proposed energy trading models utilized in
this work. The first and second model are based on single-sided auctions, which have demon-
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strated practical use through various domains. The first model consists of a single seller and
multiple buyers, whereas the second model is for single buyer and multiple sellers. Additionally,
the third model introduces an auctioneer for an energy trading network composed of multiple
sellers and multiple buyers.
Following, was a discussion of the players in the network, e.g., buyers and sellers, to illustrate
various restrictions and motivations when used for the energy trading models. In addition, a
detailed description of the parameters used to model the energy trading process was given.
Chapter 4
Proposed Single-Sided Auction Models
In this chapter, we propose two different models based on a single-sided auction mechanism
for energy prosumers and consumers. The first model, is designed for P2P energy trading that
applies to a single seller and multiple buyers (SSMB). The primary motivation of this model
is to maximize the profit of the seller by utilizing a proposed profit maximization algorithm
(PMA). The PMA employs a unique approach to maximize the income of the seller. Similarly,
the second model is designed for P2P energy trading between energy prosumers and consumers.
However, it applies to multiple sellers and a single buyer (MSSB) and focuses on optimizing
the buyer’s purchasing costs by determining the lowest price for their energy demand from the
possible various sellers. This is achieved using a proposed cost minimization algorithm (CMA).
In the first half of this chapter we discuss the initial model by illustrating the process of how
communication and energy trading is performed between a single seller and multiple buyers. In
addition, the proposed PMA algorithm is demonstrated using a simplified toy example. After
demonstrating a toy example, simulations using a more practical scenario is carried out. The
results of the simulations are then analysed using multiple types of distributions.
Similarly, in the second half we illustrate the process of how the energy and communication
transfer process is performed between multiple sellers and a single buyer. Next, the proposed
CMA algorithm is presented and tested using a toy example. Followed by a more practical
scenario and analysed using multiple types of distributions. Lastly, we present and prove the
desirable properties of an auction based mechanism.
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Figure 4.1: SSMB energy trading model
4.1 SSMB
The proposed initial model is depicted in Fig. 4.1 which illustrates the communication and
energy flow between the seller and the buyers. All the active members in the network are con-
sidered as players. In which the buyers are looking to minimize their energy costs by purchasing
at a cheaper source and the seller is looking to maximize their profit by distributing and selling
a surplus of energy. The buyers have no form of communication between each other and are
restricted to only communicate to the seller regarding their demand and bidding cost for the
selling energy. The primary motivation of this model is for individuals or a group of energy
producers that have generated a surplus of energy and would like to distribute that surplus for
a given price. In addition, the primary goal of the seller is to sell the surplus energy and to
maintain a non-negative profit. In such a situation the calculated profit is zero or negative, the
seller will store the surplus energy instead of negative payment returns. Additionally, the model
is designed in which the income of the seller depends on the amount of energy transferred to the
buyer, the line cost required to use the grid’s transmission lines and the seller’s cost needed for
generating the energy.
The basic process for P2P energy trading utilizing the proposed model is initialized with a
seller who has met their own energy requirements, and currently has a surplus energy ei, in which
they are willing to distribute to a buyer for a given price. Next, the seller will invite buyers to
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bid to meet their own requirements. Then, the buyers will send the seller their demand dj, and
bid bj. The seller will then respond with a selling energy ek. The PMA is drafted to optimize and
increase the overall profit return of the seller for this given process. Lastly, before proceeding,
the following assumptions are made. First, the main electric grid is a buyer during peak demand.
Second, the cost of the energy is cheaper to buy from the seller compared to the primary grid.
4.1.1 Network Design
The set of sellers who produce energy is denoted as S = {1, 2, 3..., n} and a set of buyers who
required energy is denoted as B = {1, 2, 3...,m}, where i ∈ S and j ∈ B. We assume that the
seller has a capacity of generating energy, and after meeting their local demands they are left
with a surplus energy denoted as ei. The energy demand of the buyers is given as dj. The set of
demands from the buyer is given as α = {d1, d2, d3, ..., dm}, dj ∈ α and dm is the demand from
the last buyer. The set of bids from the buyers to the seller is denoted by β = {b1, b2, b3, ..., bk},
bj ∈ β and k is the maximum number of bids. The operating cost, ci is the cost for the seller
to produce and maintain energy, ei. The P2P power network consists of all possible paths from
the seller to the buyers denoted as p(i,j) = {p1(i,j), p2(i,j), p3(i,j), ..., pz(i,j)}, where z is the maximum
number of paths between an energy seller i and a buyer j. Each path has its own line cost
and transmission capacity, denoted as cpl and x
p
cap respectively. The seller’s cost consists of the
transmission line cost cpl and energy generating cost c
p
i . The energy that is already flowing
through a path is given as ypg(i,j) and the energy distributed by the seller to the buyer as ek(i,j) .
Therefore, the transmission cost is the product of the distributed energy (ek(i,j)) and the line
costs in the path (cpl ).
When the transmission cost cpl and the operating cost c
p
i are greater than the buyers bid
cost bj, we will assume the seller stores their energy in a storage bank. The amount of energy
stored is denoted by ey. Where ey is the difference between the total stored energy ei and the
distributed energy ek(i,j) . We assume the main electric grid is a buyer during peak demand and
the cost of the energy is cheaper to buy from the seller compared to the main grid in this model.
4.1.2 Problem Description
In this model, the seller generates renewable energy for their local consumption and they can
sell the excess of energy to buyers connected to the smart grid in a P2P fashion. The objective
of the seller is to maximize their profit based on the buyers bid offerings and the line cost. The
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epk(i,j) ≤ ei, ∀i ∈ S (4.1c)
The line cost cpl in Equation (4.1a) is imposed by the electric grid company for using the infras-
tructure to transmit energy and it varies according to the amount of energy transferred by the
seller. The energy delivered is referred to as the selling energy, epk(i,j) and the bid offering from




the transmission line capacity, xpCap. This ensures that no path in the system is over saturated
with electric power and does not overload transmission grid, required for safety. Thus, the selling
energy, epk(i,j) , should always be less than the difference between the total amount of transmission
line capacity and the current amount of electricity flowing in the line, ypg(i,j) . This relationship
is expressed by the following formula, xpCap > (y
p
g(i,j)
+ epk(i,j)). In Equation (4.1c) we ensure that
the seller cannot distribute more than the total stored energy, ei.
When the energy is sold to the grid, we assume the seller does not need to consider the line
cost, since the main grid will cover this expense, thus the line cost cpl is zero. In addition, the
seller does not need to consider selecting the cheapest path since the transmission costs will be
zero. In the below section we will see the designed PMA algorithm to solve the above mentioned
problem.
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4.1.3 Profit Maximization Algorithm
Input: Buyers demand dj, Buyers bidding cost bj, Transmission line capacity x
p
Cap, Grid
flow ypg , Operating cost ci, and Maximum stored energy ei.
Output: Selling energy epk(i,j) , and Profit Pr(i).
Stage:1 Determining the selling energy, epk
Sort dj in ascending order
foreach dj ∈ α do










Stage:2 Determining the winning buyer
foreach bj ∈ β do
Calculate Pr(i)
Sort profit in descending order
Select the maximum Pr(i), j
if (Pr(i) > 0) then
Check constraints for j





Sell the energy to the buyer j
else













Algorithm 1: Profit Maximization Algorithm(PMA)
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4.1.4 Proposed Algorithm
Initially, the seller who has a surplus of energy, will invite the buyers in the network to
send their required demand and participate in an auction. The auction is initialized by a set
of buyers, B, with a set of bids, β. Where bj = {b1, b2, b3, ..., bk} and bj ∈ β where bj > 0.
The outputs of the PMA are the selling energy epk(i,j) and the profit of the seller Pr(i). In stage
1, after the seller receives all demands, they will select the minimum demand as their selling
energy ek. The minimum demand is determined by arranging all recieved demands in ascending
order and selecting the smallest amount. Alternatively, if the buyers all have demands above
the maximum available surplus energy of the seller, the seller will set their selling energy ek as
their total surplus ei = ek. Next, the seller will present their selling energy ek to the network.
The buyers who are interested in the amount of energy ek, will then submit their bid bj using a
sealed-bid mechanism [108] to the seller. In a sealed-bid mechanism the buyer with the highest
bid wins but in this design, due to line cost cl, the buyer which has the maximum corresponding
Pr(i) wins. The bid β will be from the buyers according to their evaluation on the amount of
energy epk(i.j) . The evaluation of the buyers is given by vj = {v1, v2, ..., vm}. Recall that buyers
have no information of the bids submitted by other buyers in the network and only communicate
with the seller.
Furthermore, in stage 2 the seller i will calculate the individual profits corresponding to each
buyer j after receiving the bids. This is done using Equation (4.1a), in which the total profit is
determined from the bid from the buyer minus the transmission line cost and seller cost. The
buyers that resulted in a positive profit continue further and the others buyers are eliminated
from the list. Thus, the remaining buyers profits are sorted in ascending order. Then, the seller
will check the constraints for the buyer with the maximum profit using Equation (4.1b). If the
buyer meets all constraints they can win the auction and if their demand is met, they will be
removed from the list. However, the seller can decide whether or not to sell the energy, enabled
by the reverse auction mechanism [109]. Alternatively, if the buyer does not meet the constraints,
then the buyer is eliminated and the next buyer with the highest profit is considered. Stage 2
continues until the energy ek is sold or none of the buyers meet the constraints.
Assuming the buyer does meet the constraints, stage 3 occurs. Stage 3 is the payment process
and the buyer j pays their submitted bid bj to the seller and is awarded the selling energy ek.
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The buyers that lost will receive nothing in return. If the profit is maximum for a particular
buyer j, then the payoff Pf of that buyer is the difference of the evaluation vj and the bid offering
bj. The buyers −j receive a payoff of 0. If the bid offering is equal to the maximum profit Pr,
the buyer will pay the cost equal to the bid offered. Otherwise, the payoff will be zero and they
do not receive the energy. The payoff function of the buyer is given below
Pf =
vj − bj, if buyer j won0, otherwise
If the winning buyer’s j energy demand has been met after the award process, they will be
eliminated from the buyer list B. If the seller has a remaining ei, the PMA repeats back to
stage 1 until the surplus energy of the seller is sold or the profit becomes negative. For each
iteration the seller i will continue to set the minimum demand as their selling energy epk(i,j) .
Where the minimum demand is chosen from the set α = {b1, b2, b3, ..., bm}, bd ∈ α. In the case




l ) the profit is negative and the seller will store their surplus energy in storage
bank. The summation of all the bids from all the winning buyers is the total seller’s reward,∑m
j=1 bj.
This proposed PMA is designed fair enough for all the buyers to present their bid offer and
considers all players equally. This ensures that buyers with the minimum demand can compete
with other buyers that require a large demand of energy. The profit of the seller depends on the
bid from the buyers bj and the losses due to transmission cost c
p
l and operating cost c
p
i . The seller
cannot change the operating cost but can reduce the transmission cost by selling their energy to
a nearby buyer in the network to further maximize their profit. This will increase the payoff of
the seller.
Shown in Fig. 4.2 is an illustration of how the buyers and seller would communicate between
each other. The working procedure consists of a seller who lets the network know they have
energy for sale. Next, the seller receives the required demands from the buyers. Then, the seller
selects the selling energy as the minimum demand, and displays the amount to the network. The
buyers will then send their demands and bid offerings for that amount of energy.
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Figure 4.2: PMA working procedure
4.1.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we analyze the proposed system model and PMA using a multitude of case
studies. For the first case study, a toy network is tested, composed of one seller and five buyers
to explain the working procedures in detail. The seller is assumed to be a small factory able
to generate their own energy requirements. This is illustrated in Fig. 4.3, in which the seller is
denoted as S and the buyers are denoted as B1, B2, B3, B4, B5. The path between the seller and
buyers are denoted as P1, P2, P3, P4, P5. For the remaining case studies, the number of buyers
is significantly increased and the changes are observed. The results from the case studies are
compared when using the proposed PMA and a first price bid method (FPB).
Simulation Setting
The algorithm was tested and simulated using MATLAB to obtain a solution for the following
case studies. In the toy example, the seller has 100 kWh of surplus energy and the demand from
the buyers ranges from [20-50] kWh. The operating cost of the seller is 1.2 cents per kWh and
the assumed transmission capacity is 1000 kWh for all possible paths within the network. It is
assumed that three of the buyers have one path to reach the seller and the other two buyers have
two paths. The line cost ranges from [0.9 - 1.6] cents per kWh. The average grid flow throughout
all possible paths is assumed to be 200 kWh. The buyers’ offer ranges from [7-14] cents/kWh
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Figure 4.3: Schematic test diagram showing the paths between the sellers and the buyers
[110] in each iteration. We further consider the main electric grid as a seller with a higher sell
cost compared to the seller. The ranges set are for simulation purposes only. We initialize the
simulation with a set of buyer’s demand. For latter case studies the number of buyers is increased
from 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, and 300. In all cases, the seller has 5000 kWh of surplus energy and
the demand from the buyers ranges from [40-1500] kWh. In the 300 case, the demands and line
costs are generated using three different types of distributions.
Simulation Results
Using the FPB method the seller receives bid offerings from all buyers for their surplus energy
ei = 100 kWh. The seller then calculates the profit Pr for each buyer using Equation (4.1a). The
highest profit calculated was 180 cents for the demand of 50 kWh from buyer 5. The seller then
distributes this 50 kWh surplus energy to buyer 5. Similarly, the seller distributes 20 kWh and
30 kWh to buyer one and two respectively. All surplus energy distributed generates a net profit
of 330 cents.
Using the PMA the seller selects the minimum demand from the set of buyers min(dj) =
20kWh. Therefore, the selling energy ek(i,j) is set to 20kWh. The seller then receives bid offerings
bj for this selling energy and calculates the profit using Equation (4.1a) for each buyer. Next,
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Figure 4.4: Sold and residual energy of the seller for
each iteration from the proposed auction mechainsm
Figure 4.5: Demand and winning demand for each
buyer from proposed auction mechanism
the seller distributes the energy to the buyer with the highest calculated profit if the constraints
are met. In the first iteration, the highest profit calculated was from buyer 5 with a value of 250
cents and the constraints were met. Thus, the 20 kWh is received by buyer 5. In each iteration,
the seller continues to select the minimum demand as the selling energy and repeats the same
procedure until the seller is left with no surplus energy remaining or the profit result is negative.
The simulation took six iterations for this case study to distribute the 100 kWh of surplus energy,
generating a total net profit of 350 cents.
Fig. 4.4 represents the sold and residual energy of the seller from the proposed algorithm. In
each iteration, the seller distributes 20 kWh, 20 kWh, 10 kWh, 20 kWh, 10 kWh and 20 kWh
respectively. Fig. 4.5 represents the demand of each buyer and how much energy each received
from the seller. Buyer 1, 2, and 5 all receive their required energy demands. Due to the line
costs and the minimal surplus of energy, buyer 3 and 4 do not acquire any energy.
We now make a comparison between FPB and PMA. Recall, that in the FPB the seller selects
the maximum bid without initializing their selling energy as the minimum demand presented from
the set buyers, β. In our proposed system model, the iteration count takes longer to compute the
optimal buyer but generates a larger profit. Fig. 4.6 displays the profit generated by the seller
after each iteration using the PMA. The total profit of the seller is the summation from each
profit generated after each iteration, resulting in a total net profit of 350 cents. Fig. 4.7 depicts
the difference in the profits of the seller between the FPB and the proposed auction mechanism.
From the results, it is concluded that the profit from our proposed algorithm significantly out
performs the existing FPB method.
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Figure 4.6: Profit generated by the seller in each
iteration from the proposed auction mechanism
Figure 4.7: Comparing the profits from the seller in
first price bid with the proposed auction mechanism
Next, the PMA and the FPB are applied and tested in a more practical scenario where there
is a total of 20 buyers with a demand ranging from [100-800] kWh with a line cost of [5-50] cents.
The seller surplus energy ei is 5000 kWh. Fig. 4.8 represents the demand from the 20 buyers as
well as the winning buyers using FPB method. It is observed that only 2 buyers attain a winning
demand compared to all 40 buyers with a profit of 11500 cents.
Figure 4.8: Demand and winning demand energy for each buyer from the first price bid method
Fig. 4.9 displays the demand from all 20 buyers and the winning demand using PMA. It is
observed that a significant amount of buyers attain a winning demand, and most importantly,
there is a large increase in the generated profit for the seller with a total net of 14750 cents.
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Figure 4.9: Demand and winning demand energy for each buyer from the proposed auction mechanism
Comparing the profit of the seller with the two methods (FPB and PMA) is shown in Fig. 4.10
for 20 buyers. It is observed that the seller generates more profit using the PMA approach than
the FPB method. Demonstrating effective performance for P2P energy trading.
Figure 4.10: Comparing seller’s net profit using first price bid with the proposed auction mechanism
Furthermore, we increase the number of buyers from 20 to 100 in steps of 20 with demands
[500-3000] kWh and the line cost are [7-12] cents. The surplus energy is 5000 kWh. The profit
variations from both FTB and PMA methods are shown in Fig. 4.11. Similarly, it is assured
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that the PMA outperforms the first price bid.
Figure 4.11: Comparing the profits from the seller in first price bid with the proposed auction mechanism
We now analyze the simulation results in more detail. For explanation purposes we will study
the case of 40 buyers in different scenarios. For example, it is possible that all buyers may have
the same bid offering to the seller. In addition, it may be possible that the line costs are the
same as well. Therefore, we can study these cases in more detail. In the first scenario, suppose
all 40 buyers have a bid of 6000 cents for a demand of 500 kWh and the line costs vary from
[7-10] cents/kWh. For the second scenario, assume the line costs are 8 cents/kWh for all 40
buyers and the bid ranges from [5000-6750] cents. In the third scenario, we assume all bids are
the same and the distances between the seller and all 40 buyers are the same. As shown from
Table 4.1, when using the FPB and the proposed mechanism, the profit of the seller is larger in
comparison for the first two cases. However, in the the third case, the profit of the seller is same
using both mechanisms. Although, in the proposed mechanism, more buyers are winning the
auction. Finally, we express the simulations results from above when the buyers have a different
bid and line cost. Observing that the seller generated 17500 cents using FPB and 17750 cents
using the PMA. From these results we further conclude that even under various scenarios the
PMA outperforms the FPB method.
Fig. 4.12 displays the profit generated during 24 hours for the proposed mechanism, with an
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40 buyers
First price bid Proposed mechanism
Same bid 15000 15500
Same line cost 17000 18970
Same bid and line
cost
14000 14000
Different bid and line
cost
17500 17750
Table 4.1: Profit of the seller
increased amount of buyers in the network. Each time slot corresponds to a two hour period.
The profit maxed at t9 which corresponds to the peak demand time during the day, where as t2
corresponds to a reduced demand. During the peak time region the grid is a buyer and we can
assume sellers can achieve higher profit returns by selling their surplus energy to the grid directly.
The results overall demonstrate that the profit is always larger using the PMA compared to the
FPB method. It is further demonstrated that the optimal time to sell energy is during peak
time.
Figure 4.12: Profit generated by the seller at different time slot in a day
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Fig. 4.13 shows the profit generated by the seller in all three methods: FPB, SPB and the
proposed mechanism. All methods are analysed using different distributions, normal, exponential
and uniform. As shown from the results, the proposed mechanism outperforms the FPB and
SPB method, in which the sellers profit is maximum for all three cases. However, recall that
the SPB method is the most truthful and is similar to the FPB method as it only varies in the
payment. The winning buyer will pay the second most winning buyer’s bid, which will increase
the payoff of the buyer since the winning buyer pays a decreased bid price. In addition, this will
decrease the seller’s profit.
Figure 4.13: Comparing profit generated by the seller with 300 buyers using first price bid, second price
bid and proposed mechanism for a normal, exponential and uniform distribution
Fig. 4.14 shows the total bid from all 300 buyers using a normal, uniform and exponential
distributions. In addition, the figure also shows the winning bid of the buyers. We observe that
the normal distribution has the highest total and winning bid cost.
Table 4.2 shows the computation time for 20 - 300 buyers. Observing that as the buyers
increase from 20 - 300, the time increases from 1.3 to 3.4 ms which is bounded. As a result,
the time complexity does increase with an increase number of buyers and the optimal solution
is computed in limited time.
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Figure 4.14: Comparing the total bid with the winning bid for 300 buyers using the proposed mechanism
at normal, exponential and uniform distribution
Time Requirement
Number of buyers 20 40 60 80 100 300
Time (ms) 2.3 2.78 2.91 3.02 3.06 3.47
Table 4.2: SSMB Time Complexity
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High Demand - Buyers
In this proposed model, the seller selects the minimum demand as the selling energy in each
iteration. This may in fact look as if we are giving importance to the buyer with minimum
demand. However this is not the case. By selecting the minimum demand, we allow the seller
to consider all buyers within the network, resulting in a fair game. In addition, it considers all
possible cases for the seller to maximize their profit return.
Sellers’ Cost
We used 1.2 cents per kWh as the sellers cost and the line cost ranges from [0.9 - 1.6] cents
per kWh for the simulation purpose. The sellers cost ci for different renewable sources in Table
4.3 is from [111] and the average distribution cost is 1.072 cents per kWh from Hydro - Thunder
Bay, ON, Canada.
Renewable Energy Cost
Sources Cost in cents per kWh
Solar Thermal 12-18
Geothermal Electricity 2 - 10
Heat 0.5 - 5.0
Biomass Electricity 5 - 15
Heat 1 - 5
Wind Onshore 3-5
Offshore 6-10
Hydro Large scale 2 - 8
Small scale 4-10
Table 4.3: Renewable energy cost in cents per kWh
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4.2 MSSB
Figure 4.15: MSSB energy trading model
In this section, the model describing the P2P energy trading process for multiple sellers and
a single buyer is presented. Fig. 4.2 illustrates the communication flow and energy transfer be-
tween the sellers and buyer. Recognizing the no sellers communicate with each other and only
communicate with the buyer. The primary motivation for the development of this model is to
reduce and minimize the buyer’s energy system costs by utilizing a proposed cost minimization
algorithm (CMA). The network design and problem description of the proposed model us dis-
cussed in detail with an in depth discussion on the CMA mechanism. Numerical results and
simulations are performed to test and compare the CMA against the first and second price bid
mechanisms.
4.2.1 Network Design
The set of sellers in the network is represented as S = {1, 2, 3.., n} where i ∈ S and contain a
surplus energy E = {e1, e2..., en}, where ei ∈ E. Each seller has a ask price which is denoted as
A = {a1, a2..., an} where ai ∈ A. The ask of the seller depends on the line cost cl and the seller’s
cost ci which includes generating and operating cost. Buyers are represented as B = {1, 2, 3..,m}
where j ∈ B. However, in this model, there is only one buyer j = 1. The demand of the buyer is
represented as dj with a valuation of Vj. The paths between the sellers and buyers are denoted
as p(i,j) = {p1(i,j), p2(i,j), p3(i,j).., pz(i,j)}.
Each path has its own line cost cl, and transmission capacity x
p
cap and. Additionally, the
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energy that is currently flowing through the path is denoted as ypg(i,j) .
4.2.2 Problem Description
The buyer’s objective is to minimize the cost based on the sellers ask ai offerings. Here, the
seller is only paying the line cost when selling the surplus energy ei to the buyer. The buyer’s
goal is to find the cheapest cost compared to all the sellers in the network. The purchasing cost






















dpj(i,j) ≤ Dj, ∀j ∈ B (4.2c)
Equation (4.2a) represents the total cost of the buyer which is given as the summation of all
the winning sellers ask ai. The constraint given in Equation (4.2b), ensures that the demand
energy, dpj(i,j) , never exceeds the transmission line capacity, x
p
Cap. This is needed to ensure the
safety of the transmission grid in which the demand energy dpj(i,j) , should always be less than the
difference between the total amount of transmission line capacity xpCap, and the current amount
of electricity flowing in the line, ypg(i,j) . The constraint given in Equation (4.2c), ensures that the
buyer cannot purchases energy from a seller more than the total demand Dj. In the following
part, the proposed CMA is presented showing showing the working procedure of the mechanism.
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4.2.3 Cost Minimization Algorithm
Input: Surplus energy ei, Sellers ask ai, Transmission line capacity x
p
Cap, Grid flow y
p
g ,
Seller cost ci and total demand Tdj.
Output: Selling energy ek, Instant demand dj and Buyer’s cost Cost(j).
Stage:1 Determining the instant demand dj
Sort ei in ascending order foreach ei ∈ E do






Stage:2 Determining the selling energy





Stage:3 Determining the winning seller
foreach ai ∈ A do
Sort i in ascending order w.r.t ai
if (Cost(j) ≤ Vj) then
Check constraints for i





Buy it from the seller, i
else
eliminate that seller i
Repeat for i+1
end
repeat till Tdj = 0
else




Algorithm 2: Cost Minimization Algorithm(CMA)
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4.2.4 Proposed Algorithm
A simplified illustration of the CMA algorithm in working progress can be seen below in
Fig. 4.16. The CMA initializes after the buyer indicates to the sellers that they are in need
of energy demand. In the first stage, the buyer receives responses from the sellers indicating
their current surplus energy ei. The buyer will then sort this information in ascending order
and select the minimum demand denoted as instant energy dj. This process in critical to ensure
fairness within the network. Alternatively, if the buyer receives demands above or equal to their
total demand, they will set their total demand as dj. This stage is the essential part for the
buyer to determine the instant demand dj. The second stage initializes with the buyer lets the
sellers aware of the instant demand dj. The sellers determine the amount of selling energy ek by
comparing it with the instant demand dj. If the surplus energy ei is greater than the received dj,
then the seller will set their selling energy ek as dj. Alternatively, the seller will set their surplus
ei as dj. The sellers will respond back to buyer with the selling energy ek or ei depending on the
previous condition. Additionally, the seller will respond with the ask ai which depends on their
line cost cl to reach the buyer and the seller cost ci for generating and operating purposes. This
is the essential stage for the sellers to determine their selling energy. In the next stage, the buyer
determines the winning seller. This is accomplished by sorting the ask ai in ascending order
according to their seller. Then, the buyer will select the seller with the minimum ask and check
the constraint given in Equation (4.2b). If the constraint is met, the seller wins the auction and
the energy is transmitted to the buyer. If the winning seller has their surplus energy completed
depleted in this process, they are removed from the list. If however, the constraint was not met,
the seller is removed from the set S. This process will repeat until the total demand of the buyer
is zero. Alternatively, if the calculated cost is greater than the buyers valuation, the buyer will
purchase their energy directly from the grid. The payment of the buyer is equal to the bid bj
the buyer offered.
4.2.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we perform a similar analysis and simulations using a toy example with
one buyer and four sellers to test the performance of CMA. We assume the sellers are small
factories able to generate their energy requirements. For the remaining case studies, the number
of sellers is significantly increased and the changes are observed in the simulations results. We
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Figure 4.16: CMA working procedure
also consider various ideal scenarios for a randomly chosen case study to observe the end effects.
In addition, the CMA is compared with a the first and second price bid mechanisms to evaluate
the performance of the proposed mechanism.
Simulation Setting
The CMA algorithm was tested and simulated using MATLAB to obtain a solution for the case
studies. In the toy example the buyer has an energy demand of 60 kWh and the surplus energy
from the sellers ranges from [20-80] kWh. The operating cost of the seller is 1.2 cents per kWh
and the line cost ranges from [0.9 - 1.6] cents per kWh. The assumed transmission capacity is
1000 kWh for all possible paths within the network. It is assumed that sellers have one path
to reach the seller and the other two buyers have two paths. The average grid flow throughout
all possible paths is assumed to be 200 kWh. The sellers’ offer ranges from [7-14] cents/kWh
[110] in each iteration. We further consider the main electric grid as a seller with a higher sell
cost compared to the seller. The ranges set are for simulation purposes only. We initialize the
simulation with a set of seller’s surplus energy. For latter case studies the number of sellers is
increased from 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, and 300. In all cases, the seller has 5000 kWh of surplus energy
and the demand from the buyers ranges from [40-1500] kWh. In the 300 case, the demands and
line costs are generated using three different types of distributions.
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Simulation Result
The simulations results from the toy example depicting the surplus and sold energy with respect
to each seller is shown in Fig. 4.17. From here, we observe that both seller 1 and seller 2 were
able to completely distribute and sell their energy to the buyer. Most importantly, we observe
that the seller with lowest amount of surplus was also still able to play and win the auction.
Furthermore, we now make a comparison using the CMA with the first and second price bid
mechanism. As shown from Fig. 4.18 we observe that the buyer’s cost is significantly more using
the second price bid mechanism. We also observe that the buyer achieves reduced energy costs
when utilizing the proposed CMA.
Figure 4.17: Toy Example: Surplus and sold energy for each seller when using the proposed mechanism
Next, we now investigate a more practical case study. Thus, the number of sellers is increased
from 4 to 20. Fig. 4.19 displays the sold and surplus energy of all 20 buyers when employing the
FPB mechanism. Observing that only four of the twenty buyers were able to sell their energy
to buyer. Comparing these results with the results from Fig. 4.20, which depicts the sold and
surplus energy of the sellers when using the CMA mechanism. We observe that an increase in
amount of buyers were able to obtain a profit and distribute energy to the buyer. Here, a total
of seven buyers were able to obtain profit as compared to four. From these results, it is expected
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Figure 4.18: Comparing buyer’s energy cost from 4 sellers using first price bid, second price bid and
proposed mechanism
that the buyer’s cost are significantly reduced since the CMA optimizes the P2P energy trading
process in a more effective manner. This observation is clearly presented in Fig. 4.21. Observing
that the CMA outperforms the first and second price bid mechanisms by reducing the buyer’s
cost significantly.
We continue the process of increasing the number of sellers form 20 to 100 in steps of 20
and compare the simulation results of the various mechanisms. Shown in Fig. 4.22. displays
the buyer’s cost when the network contains 20 to 100 buyers and the CMA, first and second
price mechanisms are employed. The results display that no matter the number of sellers in
the network, the buyer obtains a optimized and reduced energy cost when the CMA is utilized.
Demonstrating effective performance for a practical P2P energy trading process.
We now study extreme scenarios in the network when there is a total number of 60 sellers. For
the first and second scenario, we assume that the unit price and line cost is the same respectively.
The third scenario assumes both the unit price and line costs are the same. When the line costs
are the same we can assume that all sellers are located at equivalent distances to the buyer.
The last scenario, which is when the sellers have different unit prices and line costs is used
from the previous results to compare with the above scenarios. Shown in Table 4.4, depicts the
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Figure 4.19: Surplus and sold energy for each seller using the first price bid method
Figure 4.20: Surplus and sold energy for each seller using the proposed mechanism
CHAPTER 4. PROPOSED SINGLE-SIDED AUCTION MODELS 53
Figure 4.21: Comparing buyer’s energy cost from 20 sellers using first price bid, second price bid and
proposed mechanism
Figure 4.22: Comparing buyer’s energy cost from various number of sellers using first price bid, second
price bid and proposed auction mechanism
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buyer’s energy costs for all scenarios. We observe that even under extreme cases, the proposed
mechanism continues to outperform the first and second price mechanisms.
60 sellers
First price bid Second price bid Proposed mechanism
Same unit price 6904 7230 6595
Same line cost 7350 7888 6611






Table 4.4: Analysing 60 sellers at different scenarios
Furthermore, the simulations are performed testing 300 sellers when distributed using a
normal, uniform, and exponential function. Shown in Fig. 4.23 depicts the buyer’s energy cost
for each mechanism and distribution function. Observing that when using the CMA for a normal
distribution, the buyer’s energy costs are minimal. Additionally, using a uniform distribution
and the second price bid mechanism, the buyer obtains the highest energy costs. Nonetheless,
the CMA outperforms the alternative mechanisms when the sellers are distributed using various
functions.
Shown in Fig. 4.24 illustrates the comparison with the total ask and the winning ask while
using the proposed mechanism. As shown, the exponential distribution attains the highest win-
ning ask in comparison with the normal and uniform distributions. Lastly, the time complexity
curve is analyzed by determining the computation time for all simulated case studies, which is
shown in Table 4.5. Observing that the time does not increase when their is an increase in the
seller count, thus, the curve is bounded.
Table 4.5 shows the time complexity of the MSSB simulations. Observing as the sellers
increase from 20 - 300, the time increases from 1.26 - 2.8 ms. As a result, the time complexity
is bounded and the optimal solution is computed in limited time.
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Figure 4.23: Comparing the cost of the buyer with 300 sellers using first price bid, second price bid and
proposed mechanism at normal, uniform and exponential distribution
Figure 4.24: Comparing the total ask with the winning ask for 300 sellers using the proposed mechanism
for normal, uniform and exponential distribution
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Time Requirement
Number of sellers 20 40 60 80 100 300
Time (ms) 2.334 2.876 3.003 3.12 3.63 3.47
Table 4.5: MSSB Time Complexity
4.3 Proof of Desirable Properties
This section presents the mathematical and descriptive proofs for the desirable properties
of both the CMA and PMA. Recall, the properties from Chapter 2 that describe an effective
system are individually rational, truthfulness, fairness, and computational efficiency.
Property 1. Individually rational
PMA is individually rational
Proof: In PMA there are two conditions needed for the buyer to win the auction.
• ∀ bj ∈ β the bid submitted by the buyer should generate a maximum profit.
• The energy transferred to the buyer should always follow the constraints from Equation
(4.1b).
If any buyer satisfies these two conditions then that particular buyer j will be winning the auction
and pays the bid bj the buyer j submitted. The buyers −j lose the auction and does not pay
anything. Which clearly states that no single buyer loses profit by participating in the auction
and do not generate a negative payoff.
The seller sells the energy only when the bid bj from buyer j generates a positive profit. If
the profit is not positive, the seller is not selling the energy to that buyer. This ensures the seller
payoff is always positive when participating in the auction. Both the seller and buyer do not
lose anything in the PMA which proves the designed algorithm is individually rational to all the
players.
CMA is individually rational
Proof: In the CMA there are three conditions required for the seller to win the auction.
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• ∀ ai ∈ A the ask submitted to the buyer should be the minimum cost from all sellers.
• The foremost condition is the ask should be greater or equal to the buyer’s valuation
(ai ≥ Vj)
• The transferring energy should always follows the constraint in Equation (4.2b).
If any seller cleared these three stages then that particular seller i will be winning the auction and
sells the energy to the buyer. In return, the buyer pays the ask ai as the payment to the seller.
The rest of the sellers −i lose the auction and do not sell anything to the buyer. Furthermore,
the losing sellers −i do not generate any positive or negative profit. If the Cost > Vj then the
buyer will not purchase the energy from the seller. This ensures that the buyer is not paying
more than the valuation and the seller is not receiving anything less than the ask. Moreover, this
algorithm makes sure that the payoff of all the users remains zero or positive and no one loses
anything by participating in the auction. This proves the designed algorithms, PMA and CMA,
which use a single-sided auction mechanism are individually rational and no users lose anything
by participating in the proposed auction mechanism.
Property 2. Computational efficiency
PMA is computationally efficient
Proof: The PMA algorithm initiates with sorting the demands in ascending order. Finding the
minimum demand takes O(n log n) of time complexity. Next, a FOR loop is used to check all
the demands dj, which have a time complexity of O(m). Next, assigning the minimum demand
as the selling energy (min(dj) = ei) can be obtained in O(1) time. The total time complexity
of stage 1 is O(nm log n). Stage 2 initiates with calculating the profit using the bids bj from
all the buyers. This requires a FOR loop with time complexity of O(n), followed by sorting
the profits of the buyer with time complexity O(m log m). Checking the constraints can be
obtained in O(1) time. The total time complexity of stage 2 is O(m log m). Therefore, the
computational complexity of PMA is bounded by O(m log m + nm log n) Table 4.2 shows that
the computational efficiency of PMA which is bounded by a limited time.
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CMA is computationally efficient
Proof:
The CMA algorithm initiates with sorting the surplus energies ei from the seller in ascending
order. Finding the minimum demand takes O(n log n) of time complexity. Next, a FOR loop
is used to check all the demands dj, which have a time complexity of O(m). Lastly, assigning
the minimum surplus energy as the demand (min(ei) = dj) can be obtained in O(1) time.
The total time complexity of stage 1 is O(nm log n). In stage 2 we are checking the condition
using an IF statement which requires time O(1). Stage 3 Checking the constraints can be
obtained in O(1) time. The total time complexity of stage 2 is O(m log m). Therefore, the
computational complexity of CMA is bounded by O(m log m+nm log n). Table 4.5 shows that
the computational efficiency of CMA which is bounded by a limited time.
Property 3. Truthfulness
PMA is truthful
Proof: We assume that the buyers follow VCG mechanism for submitting the bids which ensures
truthfulness in the mechanism.
• If any buyer j submits a low bid, the buyer j cannot generate additional profit to the seller
and will not get a chance for winning the auction. Thus, even if any buyer cheats, this
proposed mechanism will never let the cheating buyers to win.
• In this mechanism the seller does not have any ask price, so there is no possible way for
the seller to cheat.
Concluding that buyer and seller cannot cheat using the algorithm. This demonstrates
truthfulness exists in the proposed mechanism.
CMA is truthful
Proof: We assume that the sellers follows the VCG mechanism for submitting the asks to the
buyer, which ensures truthfulness in the mechanism.
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• The only possibility of the seller with the high ask to win the auction is only when the
cost of the seller ci is greater than or equal to the valuation of the buyer Vj. If any seller i
submits a high ask to the buyer, and if the seller’s i ask ai is the lowest ask compared to
all the sellers −i, then the seller i will win the auction unless the ask is greater than the
valuation which will not increase the buyer’s cost since it is less than the sellers cost.
• In this mechanism the buyer does not have any bid price, therefore there is no possible
ways for the buyer to cheat in this mechanism.
Concluding that the buyer and seller cannot cheat using the algorithm. This shows truth-
fulness exists in the proposed mechanism.
Property 4. Fairness
PMA is fair
Proof: All buyers can bid for their energy demand. Even the buyer with lowest demand can
participate in this auction mechanism. When the seller selects the more significant bid following
the first price bid mechanism, the seller might have a better chance of losing the buyer with a
lower bid, but this algorithm ensures the possibility of winning the buyer with the lower bid.
CMA is fair
Proof: All sellers can send the ask price for their surplus energy according to their generating
and line cost. Even the seller with lowest surplus energy can participate in this auction. When
the buyer selects the highest ask by following the first price bid mechanism, the seller is more
likely of losing the buyer with a lower bid, however this algorithm ensures the possibility of the
winning of the buyer with the lower bid.
4.4 Discussion
This chapter demonstrated two different model based on a single-sided auction mechanism
for P2P energy trading in the smart grid. The initial model was targeted for multiple buyers
and a single seller. The network design and problem description of the model were presented. In
addition, the constraints and profit formulation was also demonstrated. As a result, the seller
was able to optimize their profit return when using the proposed PMA mechanism. Extensive
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simulations were tested to ensure the validity of the mechanism. In addition, alternative dis-
tribution functions were tested when employing the buyers. The PMA was compared with the
existing FPB method and as a result the PMA continually outperformed in all aspects. The
critical properties to ensure effectiveness in the mechanism was also demonstrated through proof
analysis, resulting in a fair, efficient, truthful and rational mechanism. Demonstrating a useful
auction approach for practical energy trading.
The second part of the chapter presented an alternative approach in P2P energy trading
concerning the buyer’s perspective. In which a model for a single buyer and multiple sellers was
presented, demonstrating both the network design and problem descriptions. The formulations
for the constraints were stated and the total energy cost of the buyer as well. The model was
tested using a proposed CMA mechanism, in which motivation was to minimize the buyer’s energy
cost. The CMA was tested and compared with the first and second price bid mechanisms. As a
result, the CMA outperformed the existing methods in all manners. The CMA was also resulted
in a fair, efficient, truthful and rational mechanism.
Chapter 5
Proposed Double - Sided Auction
In this chapter, a proposed system model is demonstrated for a P2P energy trading market (ETM)
composed of multiple buyers, sellers, and an auctioneer. The sellers are individuals in the ETM
that have generated a surplus of energy by use of renewable energy sources and are looking to
distribute the excess power for a profit. Similarly, the buyers are individuals in the ETM who
are seeking to meet their energy demand requirements at a lower profit. The buyers and sellers
are both dynamic players with an active response between them by interacting and negotiating
their cost for their excess energy and the demands. The auctioneer is introduced in the network
for performing all interactions and negotiations. The auctioneer’s primary function is used for
matching the sellers with the optimal buyers for maximizing the overall profit return within the
ETM. Moreover, multiple sellers with individual ask prices are used in this model which the
auctioneer uses for the optimization. The chapter begins with a detailed representation of the
ETM. Next, the market model is presented for all members of the ETM. The auction-matching
algorithm (ATM) is then demonstrated with simulation results and analysis. Further conclusions
are then presented.
5.1 Energy Trading Market
As depicted in Fig. 5.1, the ETM consists of an auctioneer and a set of sellers and buyers.
The sellers and buyers in the ETM are active players with continuous communication with the
auctioneer. The market runs in a decentralized platform with bi-directional communication. As
a result, energy and communication flow is transmitted via seller to auctioneer and buyer to
auctioneer. Thus, the energy is traded in a P2P fashion [9].It is further considered that the
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Figure 5.1: Energy trading model for double-sided auction
losses are minimal within the distribution feeders [112]. The auctioneer is the primary function
of the ETM and controls and operates the entire network. Nothing that the buyers and seller
do not communication directly. The sellers will communicate with the auctioneer regarding
their current surplus energy, and the buyer interacts with the auctioneer regarding their current
energy requirement and bid offering. With this given information, the auctioneer has to match
the buyers with the sellers concerning system efficiency, truthfulness, and budget balance. In
addition, the auctioneer’s motivation is to optimize the social welfare within the P2P ETM.
5.2 Market Members Modeling
The market is formed by the number of active sellers and buyers. The sellers are the in-
dividuals who generate energy from a type of renewable source, and upon meeting their local
demands, seek to distribute their excess energy ei for a price in the EMT to generate a profit.
The set of sellers are denoted as S = {1, 2, 3..., n} where i ∈ S. The sellers cost, ci is the cost for
the seller to generate and maintain their energy, ei. The summation of the operating cost co and
generating cost cg is the total cost ci of each seller.
ci = co + cg (5.1)
The generating cost cg is a quadrative convex function [88] with predetermined constants. The
operating cost co is the cost of maintaining and operating the power generating device. All the
buyers and sellers in the ETM are required to pay the line cost cl when using the infrastructure
supplied by the central grid for transferring and receiving energy. The surplus energy from the
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seller can be transferred to many buyers and the subset is formed ei =
∑m
j=1 dj. Each seller has
a individual ask price according to the cost function of the surplus energy. The ask is denoted
as A = {a1, a2, a3..., an} where ai ∈ A. The sellers receive a reward Psi for generating and selling
their surplus energy, and the auctioneer chooses that reward price. The welfare of the seller is
given by








where PSi is the reward received by each seller, ci and cl are the seller cost and line cost and ei
is surplus energy. Equation (5.2) is the total welfare of each seller, and each sellers’ goal is to
maximize their welfare.
Buyers are the players who are willing to buy their energy demands from the sellers in the
ETM. The set of buyers are denoted as B = {1, 2, 3...,m} where j ∈ B with their demand is
given α = {d1, d2, d3, ..., dm}, dj ∈ α. The bid for their required energy demand is denoted as
β = {b1, b2, b3, ..., bm}, bj ∈ β. For using the transmission lines from the central grid, each buyer
needs to pay the line cost cl according to their demand and load on the line. Furthermore, each
buyer has their own valuation on the energy which represents their satisfaction level from the
available energy sources from the market and the valuation function should be a non-decreasing
function [113]. Thus, the valuation is denoted by V = {V1, V2, V3, ..., Vm}, Vj ∈ V and the
equation for valuation of each buyer is from [88] shown in Equation (5.3) considering ξj and $j
as predetermined constants
vj = ξjdj −$jd2j , ∀j ∈ B (5.3)
The demand of the buyer is met with the summation of all the received energy from the
buyers dj =
∑n
i=1 ei. The buyers pay the payment Pbj for buying the surplus energy to the
seller and the payment price PBj is chosen by the auctioneer. Shown below in Equation (5.4)
represents the welfare of the buyer.








Where Vj is the valuation, Pbj is the payment, dj and ci are the demand and operating costs
receptively. The primary motivation all players is to maximize their welfare, and the goal of this
market is to maximize the total social welfare. Therefore, we want to maximize the following








Where n and m are the total number of the sellers and the buyers. This convex problem is solved
by having a third party called an auctioneer, which is placed between the buyers and the sellers.
The auctioneer follows an auction mechanism to decide the winner.
5.2.1 Auction Process
The double-sided auction is considered as a game with sellers and buyers as players following
the bid and ask from the individual player’s valuation. The valuation of the individual players are
not known by the auctioneer [114]. The auctioneer matches the buyer with the seller according
to the ask and bid from the seller and buyer. The auction is initialized only when the asks are
greater than the bid (ai < bj) and there will be no auction when (ai > bj) or (ai = bj), thus a
VCG mechanism exists in this auction. In a VCG mechanism, if the bid is equal or lesser than
the ask, then no trade takes place between the seller and buyer. Furthermore, each seller sends
their excess energy ei to the auctioneer, and at the same time, each buyer sends their demand
dj to the auctioneer. The role of the auctioneer is to match the buyers with the sellers following
properties and conditions.
5.2.2 Price and Line Cost
The auctioneer calculates the price λ after collecting all bids and demands, (bj, bd) from the
buyer and all the surplus energy and ask price, (ei, ai) from the sellers. Where n and m are the
total number of seller sand the total number of the buyers in the network respectively. The price














where ai, bj, ei, dj are the ask, bid, surplus energy, and demand respectively. The price λ is
calculated at a particular instant in time within the EMT. When using the grid for transporting
and receiving energy, sellers and buyers need to pay the line cost cl. The line cost varies and
depends on the amount of energy being transported from seller to buyer. The line cost expressed
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where z and nl is the total number of paths and lines respectively, yg is the energy flowing on
the particular path and PTDFij (Power Transfer Distribution Factor) is a linear approximation
of the distribution factor in a CRR (Congestion Review Rights) model [115] which indicates the
fraction of transferred power between the seller i and the buyer j. PTDFij for single line l by Υ






Where $ = {i, j, t} is the transferred t unit of energy from the seller i to buyer j. The
injection shift factor (ISF) in the line l is given by Υil and Υ
j
l for bus i and j.
5.2.3 Fair Price Range
The fair price range is calculated to determine the price which can benefit both the buyer
and seller from the low bid and high ask respectively. This calculation ensures no buyers have
bids that are too low and additionally, no sellers have asks too high. The auctioneer can use the
below method to calculate the fair range for the buyers and sellers in an auction. Any buyer
that bids lesser than the price range is a loss for the seller and any seller who asks higher than
the price range is a loss to the buyer. Therefore, it is necessary to determine an optimal range
where both the buyers and sellers can agree on a price. This equation will help in determining
the price range needed to benefit both parties, thus, no buyers and sellers will face any losses.
There are multiple factors which make it hard to determine the fair ask price for sellers, as each
of them has various alternative generating costs due to the different energy generating devices,
such as Solar, Hydro, Wind, etc. Hence, we can only fix a range and not the actual cost, leading
to the following expression
λmin ≤ λ ≤ λmax. (5.9)
Where λmin is the average of all buyers bids lesser than the λ and λmax is the average of all
the sellers asks greater than λ. Denoted as









According to this method, the buyer’s bid cannot be lesser than λmin and the seller’s ask
cannot be higher than the λmax. All the buyers with bids below the λmin and the sellers with
ask greater than λmin will be removed from the auction and cannot participate in the auction.
The calculation of λmin and λmax are demonstrated below to calculate the fair price range.
5.2.4 Assumption and Preconditions
The following assumptions and preconditions for the ETM are presented before continuing
further.
• The losses are less while trading energy.
• The buyer receives the amount of energy the seller sends.
• The auctioneer has all required information of the network.
• No interaction between the sellers and buyers.
• No interaction between the seller i with other sellers −i and buyer j with other buyers −j.
• If (ai
ei
> λmax, ∀i) or ( bjdj > λmin, ∀j), then i or j are eliminated from the market.
In the following section the auction matching mechanism is proposed discussing the critical
stages of the process.
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5.3 Auction-Matching Algorithm
Stage:1 Matching
Input Buyers demand dj, Buyers bid bj,Surplus energy ei, Sellers ask ai .
Output Seller group Sig, Buyers group B
j
g .











j /∈ i , i /∈ j
end
end
Stage:2 Determining the winning buyers and sellers
Input Seller group Sig, Buyers group B
j
g, Total Demand Tdj and Total energy Tei .
Output Winning seller Siw, Winning buyers B
j
w .
foreach ai ∈ A and dj ∈ α do
sort i, ai in ascending order
sort j, dj in descending order
if (Tei < Tdj) then
if (ei = dj) then
buyer j won energy from seller i
else
∀dj ⊂ Sig 6= ei
Select the buyer with maximum demand
end
continue the process till ei = 0
else
if (dj = ei) then
seller i is selected for buyer j
else
∀ei ⊂ Bjg 6= dj
Select the seller with minimum ask
end
continue the process till dj = 0.
end
end
Algorithm 3: Auction-Matching Algorithm (AMA)
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5.4 Energy Allocation
Energy allocation using greedy method, in which a seller with the minimum ask is given
priority to buyers with equal or the highest demand compared to the sellers, and buyer with the
highest demand is preferred first to the sellers with an equal surplus energy or lesser ask. The
auctioneer determines the matching between the buyers and the sellers following the conditions.
The matching is achieved by changing orders with preference structures and optimizing the social
welfare [116]. As the auctioneer does not see the buyer’s valuation and seller’s cost of generating
the energy, the auctioneer can only fix some conditions for the seller’s ask, and the buyer’s bid
when it is not too big or too low compared to the market value. Besides, the auctioneer wants
to make sure that no buyer pays more than the bid and no seller receives less than the ask.
5.4.1 Matching
Matching condition checks the unit price of the sellers and buyers and forms a group where







Condition, ensures that no seller receives the reward lesser than the ask (PSi ≮ ai). Therefore,
it would be optimal for the auctioneer to pick any one value between the ask ai and bid bj as
the reward PSi and payment PBj to the seller and buyer. It also assures that the auctioneer’s
welfare has also remained positive.
An example is shown below for a further understanding of the proposed matching concept.
Let us consider 5 sellers {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5} and 5 buyers {B1, B2, B3, B4, B5} in the ETM.
Each seller has an ask ai and surplus energy ei similarly, each buyer has a demand dj and bid




g. The buyers B1, B2 and B3 satisfies the
Equation (5.10) for S1, and these three buyers forms a group under the seller S1 as S1g = {B1,
B2, B3} likewise, each sellers will have an individual group {S1g , S2g , S3g , S4g , S5g} with the buyers
who all satisfies the Equation (5.10) for the individual sellers. The sellers S3, S4, S8 and S9 fits
the Equation (5.10) to B5. Moreover, these 4 sellers form a group with the buyer B5 as B5g =
{S3, S4, S8, S9}. Similarly, each buyer will have an individual group {B1g , B2g , B3g , B4g , B5g} with
the sellers who all obey the Equation (5.10) for the individual buyers.
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5.4.2 Condition
let us assume the cost of sellers and buyers are equal, thus
cl + bj = cl + ai
Now since both the sellers and buyers need to pay the line cost, we can eliminate the line cost
from the previous equation, hence
bj = ai
bj → vj, ai → ci.
The bid of the buyer depends on the buyer’s valuation but the ask of the seller depends on the
generating and operating cost. Therefore, the valuation of the buyer can never be equal to the
generating cost. This is the reason why we are checking if the bid is higher than the ask in the
above condition to make it fair for both buyer and seller. Therefore, the buyers bid cannot be
equal to the sellers ask price.
bj 6= ai.
The main reason we match the buyers with the higher bid to the sellers with the lesser ask
as in Equation (5.10), is to always ensure that the social welfare of the market Is increased. This
is because social welfare depends on each player, which will increase the profit of the sellers and
reduce the cost of the buyer. Thus the social welfare is increased
5.4.3 Selecting the Winning Buyer and Seller
Winning sellers and winning buyers are determined under two various scenarios. In scenario
1, the total surplus energy of the seller is lesser than the total demand of the buyer in the EMT
(Tei < Tdj) and in scenario 2, the total demand of the buyers is lesser than the total surplus
energy of the seller (Tdj < Tei) in ETM.
Scenario 1 (Tei < Tdj)
Under this scenario, the total surplus energy is lesser than the total demand (Tei < Tdj) in the
ETM. Therefore, all the sellers in the market will be cleared easily leaving some buyers without
meeting the demand.
1. Sellers with the minimum ask are preferred first.
2. Buyers with equal demand (dj = ei) to the seller’s surplus energy are cleared first.
3. ∀dj ⊂ Sig 6= ei
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If no buyer’s demand is equal to the seller surplus energy (dj 6= ei) then the buyer with
highest demand in the group Sig are cleared first. In the previous section, each seller has a group
Sig of eligible buyers under them. After sorting the sellers in ascending order concerning the ask
ai, check if any buyers demand is equal to the surplus energy (dj = ei) and if the condition
is met, the seller and buyer won the auction. If no demand is the same as the surplus energy
(dj 6= ei), then the buyer with the highest demand from the seller group Sig can win the seller’s
surplus energy. Repeat the same two process until the seller has no surplus energy left. Follow
the same procedure for all the sellers in the market clearing the sellers with minimum demand
apex.
Scenario 2 (Tdj < Tei)
In this scenario, the total demand is lesser than the total surplus energy (Tdj < Tei) in the
ETM. Therefore, the buyers are preferred first and all buyers easily can meet the demand leaving
some sellers without selling the surplus energy.
1. Buyers with higher demand are cleared first.
2. Sellers with equal ask or minimum ask are preferred first.
From the grouping section, each buyer has a group Big of sellers under them. After sorting
the buyer with the highest demand, check if any seller from the corresponding group of the buyer
has the same surplus energy as the buyer demand (ei = dj) and if the condition is met, the buyer
and seller won the auction. If no surplus energy is equal to the demand (ei 6= dj), then the seller
with minimum ask is cleared first. Repeat the same two procedures until the buyer’s demand
met. Follow the same for all the buyers in descending order clearing the buyers with maximum
demand at the apex.
Payment and Reward
We assume each seller and buyer follow VCG mechanism for payment which ensures the truth-
fulness among the players. The buyer pays the payment PBj for buying the demanded energy,
and the seller receives the reward PSi for selling the surplus energy. The auctioneer is the one
who selects the price for payment and reward. The buyer payment should never be greater than
the bid bj, and the seller reward is never lesser than the ask ai which is the essential condition for
the design to follow the properties of individual rationality, truthfulness, budget-balanced and
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fairness.
There are two types of payment methods that can be used for this model:
• 1. Random value: In this method, the auctioneer picks a random value between the bid bj
and ask ai of the winning buyer and seller. For example, consider that the winning buyer
has a bid bj of 20 cents, and the winning sellers has a ask ai of 10 cents. The auctioneer
will now select any value between from 11 cents to 19 cents. Then, this will be payment of
the buyer and the reward of the seller.
• 2. Second price bid : In this method, the auctioneer selects the second highest bid as the
winning buyer’s payment for the reward of the seller.
Further, two types of incomes are available for the auctioneer, the first method makes ”no
income” or ”zero income” for the auctioneer which follows a strong budget balanced (SBB)
property, and the next method, ”makes income” or ”positive income” to the auctioneer which
follows weak budget balanced (WBB) property. The auctioneer should generate revenue for
matching the sellers and the buyers which will motivate the auctioneer to do the role. In the
first income method, the auctioneer can pick any value in-between the ai and bj as the reward
PSi and payment PBj to the seller and buyer after matching the buyer with the seller. Equation
(5.11) will return nothing to the auctioneer. Still, the system remains budget-balanced since no
participators including the auctioneer pay-off are in negative range.
bj > PBj = PSi ≥ ai (5.11)
The matching is established with the ask of the sellers is lesser than the buyer’s bid (ai < bj).
So, if the auctioneer makes the whole bid bj as the payment PBj from the buyer and pays it s
the reward PSi to the seller, then the auctioneer will generate zero income. The income of the
auctioneer is the difference between the payment and the reward, given by Equation (5.12).
AuctioneerRevenue = PBj − PSi (5.12)
To generate positive income, the auctioneer should equate the payment to the bid and equate
the reward to the ask as shown in Equation (5.13) so, the difference between the payment and
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reward will be the income of the auctioneer.
bj = PBj, ai = PSi (5.13)
Equation (5.13) ensures that the auctioneer welfare is also increased and the system follows the
property budget-balance since no participators including the auctioneer lose anything. Thus, the
VCG mechanism optimizes the social welfare with truthfulness, and allows the buyer to submit
a true value. If the buyer does not provide a real value, the buyer will not get anything in return.
These are the procedure that are designed for the auctioneer follow.
5.5 Numerical Results
For the following simulation, we consider fifteen users in total, with seven buyers and eight
sellers. The bid and the ask are of true valuation and true cost [9]. The below table shows the
number of sellers, i and buyers, j with their surplus energy ei, ask ai, demand dj, and bid bj.
Sellers and Buyers List
Sellers, i Selling energy, ei ask, ai Buyers, j demand, dj bid, bj
1 10 80 1 20 300
2 20 240 2 40 220
3 30 330 3 70 1050
4 50 550 4 10 60
5 10 90 5 10 100
6 60 780 6 20 300
7 60 720 7 40 480
8 30 450
Table 5.1: An illustrative example for model 2
5.5.1 Simulation Setting
The algorithm was tested and simulated using C-programming. The surplus energy of the
seller ranges from [10-60] kWh, and the ask for the surplus energy ranges from [80-780] cents.
It shows each seller has the ask range [7-14] cents per kilowatt [110]. The demand from the
buyer ranges from [10-70] kWh and bids for the demanded energy range from [60-1050] cents.
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Which shows each buyer’s valuation of energy ranges from [6-18] cents. A walk-through example
is shown below explaining the working of the algorithm.
5.5.2 Simulation Result
Eligibility
The first thing to do is to check all the sellers and buyers that are eligible for the auction. This
step calculates λ, λmin and λmax. The calculated values are λ = 11.5 cents, λmin = 7.16 cents
and λmax = 12.3 cents from Equation (5.5). λmin is the average of bids from buyer whose bids
are lesser than λ and λmax is the average of asks from seller whose asks are greater than λ.
The sellers with ask above the λmax and the buyers with bid lesser than λmin are automatically
eliminated from the auction. Thus, seller {S6}, buyer {B2 and B4} are excluded from the auction.
Sellers:{S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S7} and buyers:{B1, B3, B5, B6, B7, B8} are only allowed in the
auction.
Grouping
This is the first stage the auctioneer does after receiving all the surplus energy ei and ask ai from
the seller and all the demand dj and bid b)j.
• Seller 1 has ei = 10 kWh with ai = 80 cents which results with a unit price of 8 cents.
According to the algorithm, all the buyers greater than the unit price of 8 cents are in the
group of seller 1. Thus, buyers {B1, B3, B5, B6, B7, B8} Are grouped with the seller 1
with the demand of {20, 70, 10, 20, 40, 30}. Similarly, all the buyers with a higher bid
than the sellers ask are present in each seller’s group.
• Seller 2 has ei = 20 kWh with ai = 240 cents is grouped with buyers {B1, B3, B6, B8}
with the demand of {20, 70, 20, 30} kWh.
• Seller 3 has ei = 30 kWh with ai = 330 cents is grouped with buyers {B1, B3, B6, B7, B8}
with the demand of {20, 70, 20, 40, 30} kWh.
• Seller 4 has ei = 50 kWh with ai = 550 cents is grouped with buyers {B1, B3, B6, B7, B8}
with the demand of {20, 70, 20, 40, 30} kWh.
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• Seller 5 has ei = 10 kWh with ai = 90 cents is grouped with buyers {B1, B3, B5, B6, B7,
B8} with the demand of {20, 70, 10, 20, 40, 30} kWh.
• Seller 7 has ei = 60 kWh with ai = 720 cents is grouped with buyers {B1, B3, B6, B8}with
the demand of {20, 70, 20, 30} kWh.
Winning Buyers and Sellers
Now, here the auctioneer follows two conditions to make the auction process fair and value.
1. Sellers with lesser asks are given first priority.
2. Buyers with higher demands are cleared first.
Matching the buyers with the sellers, at first the auctioneer looks if any buyer’s demand is
equal to the sellers surplus energy dj = ei inside the first seller group. If so, then the seller can
sell the surplus energy to the buyer with the same amount of demand. If not, the auctioneer
selects the buyer with the higher demand to the seller. Finally, still, the seller is left with surplus
energy, the next highest top demand buyer is chosen. After the sorting the sellers in ascending
order the priority (sellers are cleared in this order) is given in the order of {S1, S5, S3, S4, S2,
S6 } Following the algorithm the market clearing mechanism takes place.
• Seller 1: Buyer 5 wins 10 kWh with the condition dj = bj since seller 1 surplus energy and
buyer 3 demands are equal.
• Seller 5: The buyer with highest demand is selected. Buyer 3 wins 10 kWh and left with
60 kWh demand.
• Seller 3: Buyer 8 wins 30 kWh.
• Seller 4: Buyer 3 wins 50 kWh and left with 10 kWh demand.
• Seller 2: Buyer 1 wins 20 kWh.
• Seller 7: Buyer 6 and buyer 7 wins 20 and 40 kWh.
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Payment
The auctioneer selects the price PSi and PBj from the winning seller and buyer. Following
Eq.(5.10) using random value method.
• S1:{B5} Buyer 5 pays 90 cents to seller 1 PS1 = PB5
• S2:{B1} Buyer 1 pays 270 cents to seller 2 PS1 = PB5
• S3:{B8} Buyer 8 pays 390 cents to seller 3 PS1 = PB5
• S4:{B3} Buyer 3 pays 600 cents to seller 4 PS1 = PB5
• S5:{B3} Buyer 3 pays 140 to seller 5 PS1 = PB5
• S7:{B6, B7} Buyer 6 and 7 pays 290 and 460 cents to seller 7 PS1 = PB5
Since buyer 3 wins partial demand from seller 4 and partial demand from seller 5, buyer 3
only partially for both the sellers. Below are the following summary results from this case study.
• Total welfare of sellers = 2240
• Total ask of the seller = 2010
• Total buyers bid = 2680
• Total welfare of the buyer = 2680 - 2240 = 440
For this illustrated example, all the eligible sellers sold their total energy of 180 kWh, but
buyer 3 left with 10 kWh demand and the rest of all the qualified buyers met their demand
of 180 kWh. Fig. 5.2 illustrates the ask price and reward of each seller from the example. As
depicted, all but a single seller successfully generated a positive profit. In addition, even the
sellers with a reduced surplus were able to participate and win in the auction. Thus, proving
fairness. Furthermore, from displayed in Fig. 5.3, which shows the buyers bid and payment, we
see that the buyer were able to pay less than their required bid. Further allowing all players to
participate in the auction.
Fig. 5.4 displays the results of how each buyer and seller were assigned. Observing that dual
assignment is possible, seller 4 and 5 distributes their surplus to the buyer 3. Similarly, buyer 6
and 7 receives energy from seller 7.
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Figure 5.2: Comparing the ask ai and reward PSi for the participated sellers
Figure 5.3: Comparing the bid bj and payment PBj for the participated buyers
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Figure 5.4: Matched winning sellers and buyers
Next, the amount of sellers and buyers are increased to 25, 50 and 75 and the simulation is
performed. Fig. 5.5 illustrates the total ask and reward for all winning sellers using the AMA
algorithm. As clearly shown, the winning sellers receive more than their ask price, encouraging
all prosumers to generate clean energy and utilize it in profitable manner.
Figure 5.5: Comparing the total ask of all winning sellers with the total reward of all winning sellers
Fig. 5.6 shows the total bid and payment of the winning buyers. As shown, no buyers pays
more than their bid and the overall payment is less than their submitted bid. Thus, the AMA
algorithm encourages the buyers to buy clean energy from the prosumers as their cost is reduced.
We now observe the social welfare of the network as shown Fig. 5.7. As depicted, the payment
and reward is always maintained between the total ask and total bid from all winning users. This
is ensured from the matching used in Eq.5.10. Which matches only the buyer with the higher
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Figure 5.6: Comparing the total bid from all winning buyers with the total payment from all the winning
buyers
bid to the seller with lesser ask, e.g., (bj > ai). This balances the energy trading market and
both the prosumers and consumers increases their welfare. As a result, the social welfare of the
market is maintained
Figure 5.7: Comparing the total sytem cost
Next, the amount of sellers and buyers were increased to 500 and the simulations were
performed. This was done using a uniform distribution. The results of the uniform distribution
are shown in Fig. 5.8. Observing how each seller and buyer are matched.
Table 5.2 summarizes the computation time for 50 - 1000 users. Observing that as the users
increase from 50 - 1000, the time increases from 8.1 - 61 ms. With the optimal solution computed
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Figure 5.8: Matched sellers and buyers using uniform distribution
in a limited amount of time.
Time Requirement
Number of users 50 100 150 1000
Time (ms) 1.502 6.747 16.172 92.47
Table 5.2: Time Complexity
5.6 Proof of Desirable Properties
This section proves the properties of budget balance, truthfulness, computational efficiency,
and system efficiency in the proposed algorithm.
Property 1. AMA is individually rational





) to match the
buyers with sellers, which allows the sellers to group only with the buyers having a higher bid
than the seller’s ask. This assures that no seller receives the reward lesser than the ask. Equation
(5.8) indirectly mentions ai < bj the ask of the seller is always lesser than the bid of the buyer.
Thus, the losing seller does not receive any reward and the losing buyer is not charged any
payment. Similarly, the auctioneer picks the reward and payment to the seller and buyer using
the condition (bj > PBj = PSi ≥ ai) which assures no buyer pays the payment more than the
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bid. As seen from the case study, the proposed algorithm never charges a payment higher than
the individual buyer’s bid while each seller receives the reward equal or higher than the ask.
The clarification mentioned earlier proves the algorithm is individually rational to both sellers
and buyers. Auctioneer payoff is zero which is non-negative and non- positive, and this further
proves no participators including the auctioneer lose anything using this mechanism.
Property 2. AMA is computationally efficient
Proof: The AMA algorithm starts with matching the sellers and buyers based on the condi-
tion in Equation (5.10) which requires computational time of O(n). Next. in stage 2, the for loop
is initiated with time complexity of O(n) followed by sorting the sellers and buyers in arranging
and descending order requires O(n log n) and O(m log m) respectively. The IF statement in the
algorithm used to check the condition uses O(1) computational time. The input of stage 2 is the
output from stage 1, satisfies |Sw| ≤ |S| ≤ m with the time complexity of O(m2). The total time
complexity of this mechanism is polynomial in the order of O(m2 +mn log n). Table 5.2 shows
that the computational efficiency of AMA, where the solution is obtained in a limited time.
Property 3. AMA is budget-balanced
Proof: After determining the winning sellers and buyers, the auctioneer selects the reward
PSi and payment PBj to the seller and buyer using the condition (bj > PBj = PSi ≥ ai). There is
no shortage by the auctioneer, and the payment paid by the buyer is equal to the reward received






(PBj − PSi) = 0 ∀Bjw , Siw (5.14)
Which further shows the proposed mechanism is strongly budget balanced, since the payoff of
the auctioneer is zero and proves no participating players lose using the proposed mechanism.
Property 4. AMA is truthful
Proof: We assume both the sellers and buyers follow the VCG mechanism in submitting the
ask and bid to the auctioneer.
Lemma 1 Algorithm is truthful to the seller.
• If any greedy seller submits a high ask that will be out of the range λ to λmax and auto-
matically that seller is eliminated from trading.
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• Assume that any seller with the higher ask participated in the auction, then before they
are matched with any buyer, the auctioneer follows an condition ai < bj for matching the
seller with the buyer. Ensuring that the seller with the highest ask cannot be matched with
any buyer unless if any buyer’s bid is greater than the ask of the seller.
• At various time the seller cost ci may be higher for generating the energy. Considering
that the buyer needs to pay too much of the cost to buy that energy from the seller with a
higher generating cost and the system efficiency decreases by the buyer who pays more to
buy the energy. Thus, the auctioneer eliminates the seller from the auction.
Therefore, whatever the case for the seller to submit a high ask ∀ai ∈ A it is been shown
clearly the seller with the high ask is eliminated from the auction or not matched with any buyers.
Lemma 2 The algorithm is truthful to the buyer.
Buyer’s bid bj will be matched with the seller under the major condition in Equation (5.8).
• If any buyer j submits a low bid bj, then the buyer j cannot be matched with any seller
unless the ask of any seller is lesser than the bid (ai < bj).
• If no sellers ask ai is lesser than the bid bj of buyer j, (ai ≮ bj) then the buyer j is not
matched with any seller i.
This assures no buyer with a low bid is matched with any seller and wins the auction. This
further proves that AMA is truthful for both sellers and buyers in the auction.
Property 5. AMA is fair
Proof: This mechanism is designed fair for both the sellers and buyers to submit the ask ai
and bid bj from the individual valuation. All players have an equal opportunity to submit the
bid and ask. The matching is made only with the highest bid from the buyer to the seller with
a low ask.
5.7 Discussion
This chapter demonstrated a double-sided auction mechanism for a P2P ETM market. The
market consist of multiple sellers, multiple buyers and an auctioneer. The sellers are considered
as small factories or individual with a surplus of energy. The buyers are players in the net-
work looking for clean alternative energy sources to meet their demand. It was shown that the
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auctioneer effectively matches the sellers and buyers to optimize the social welfare of the ETM.
The model is suitable for market subscribers. Here, we proposed a mechanism which is strongly
budget balanced i.e., no participators payoff is in negative. The results show, that the auctioneer
does not recieve any profit. In future we can design a different payment method in which the
payment of the buyer is not equal with the seller reward (PBj 6= PSi) and the auctioneer can
make profit in return for matching the sellers with the buyers.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
This research demonstrated three P2P energy trading models for the emerging smart grid
infrastructure to address the issue of reducing stress at the distribution level. The first two
models are based upon a single-sided auction mechanism, which are used to optimize the seller
and the buyers’ energy costs through a proposed PMA and CMA mechanisms respectively. The
PMA is used to maximize the profit return of the seller when seeking to distribute surplus energy
to a buyers in the network. It was demonstrated through the simulations results that the seller
was able to maximize their profit and was compared with exiting mechanisms in which the PMA
outperformed. Similarly, the CMA was simulated and compared with alternative approaches and
it was shown that the proposed mechanism outperformed in all manners with regards to reducing
the buyers energy costs. It was also shown through proof and analysis that both models exhibit
the desirable properties of individual rationality, computational efficiency, truthful, fairness and
budget balanced. A last model was based on a double-sided auction which introduced an auc-
tioneer to optimize the social welfare of an ETM by matching buyers and sellers such that the
resultant energy cost would be minimized for each player. A proposed AMA was demonstrated
and simulated to evaluate the performance of the system model. It was also shown through
proof that the model exhibits the desirable properties of individual rationality, computational
efficiency, truthful, fairness and budget balanced. This research resulted in effective and practical
auction-based models to incentive and motivate users to invest and participate in P2P energy
trading.
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6.2 Future Work
Future work would investigate and explore alternative pricing schemes for the double-side
auction which would enable the auctioneer to obtain a profit return. Additionally, various and
diverse settings of the ETM market would also be explored. This work focused mainly on
designing the P2P energy trading models for static scenarios. Future work would focus on the
dynamic properties of the smart grid network to consider the minimum path at all instances in
time. An example would be to design algorithms that dynamically select the shortest/least cost
path between the source and destination. In addition, we would like to design the models that
take into consideration of the season. This can capture the dynamic variations of the supply and
load of the smart grid network.
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